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Preface: A Note on the Inclusion of Photos
Violence before the camera is a tricky thing. Writers often have attested to the physical and
dizzying effects pictures of human subjects stripped of their humanity-people brought down to
the lowest common denominator of organic life, people treated as things that have neither body
nor soul; physical feelings of disgust, the turn of the stomach, and dizziness. In the time I spent
with these pictures I finally came to understand that feeling.Images of atrocity are haunts of real
violence which occured, yet, in bearing this mark of horror, something is communicated which is
not often felt by testimony alone. But they do so at a distance, which may be a critical one, but is
still a distance all the same. I struggle with wanting to include pictures, especially Lee Miller's
work. On one hand I felt include the pictures meant to replicate visions of violence which felt, at
times, superfluous and unnecessary. On the other hand, if I were to leave them out I would, in a
way, undermine my own argument by attesting to the fact there is an inextricable reaction when
one looks at a photograph of horror that is not the same as when looking at any other
representational medium. In the end I included the pictures because I am, after all, talking about
photographs and unlike Sontag I do not contain the literary capacity to textually replicate a
sufficient copy of the camera vision. However, I do want to recognize that these pictures
discussed in this paper do contain graphic depictions of genocide, death, and mass graves. As
such, they should be viewed with trepidation, care, and respect both for ourselves as witnesses
and for the dead.
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Introduction
What does it mean to picture Human Rights? Rights are of course, immaterial concepts.
They can not be held in our hands, turned over and over like a stone or a penny, it would seem at
first, paradoxical that universal rights are so widely defended in pictures. Perhaps then more
pertinent question to ask would be, in what form must right appear to ‘work’ in pictures? Unlike
the French and American declarations, Human Rights asserted a wholly new conception of rights
where material needs were as much rights to be defended, afforded, and assured as life, liberty,
and justice. Human Rights signified two profound shifts in the definition of ‘rights’; first and
foremost they conceptualized that one deserved rights solely based on an inalienable humanity,
rather than citizenship, and secondly new forms of rights, namely the right to the material
necessities of life, where enshrined as equal to the political rights of former declarations. These
new conceptions of rights, this paper will arue, would not have been made if the first drafters of
the UniverslDeclaration of Human Right had born witness to the attrocities of the Holocaust
through drawing, painting, literautre, or the testimony of survivors. Rather than follow a textual,
literary, or political trail in outlining the emergence of Human Rights will follow a similar
pictorial emergence of right as Sharon Sliwinski outlines in Human Rights in Camera. In
Sliwinski’s pictorial lineage of rights reveals a drastically different story of how Human Rights
came to be;
Attending these aesthetic scenes as primary historical evidence-focusing on the picture trail rather
than the textual trail-generates a strikingly different narrative about the development of universal
human rights. Such a construction asks us to rethink how the very concepts of ‘humanity’ or even
‘the human’ come to be envisaged and held in imagination. Put differently, attending these
Aesthetic scenes casts a spotlight on a figure that is usually not accorded much due in the
traditional story of how human beings become human. Indeed, in this narrative the spectator has a
starring role.1
1

Sliwinski, Sharon. Human Rights in Camera. University of Chicago Press, 2011, 19-20.
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I would add, in addition to arising from an aesthetic encounter with atrocity, as seen through the
camera's field of vision and its unique aesthetics, Human Rights became imbued with a
photographic structure and form. Simply put, Human Rights are photographic.
Human Rights emerged from the unique aesthetics of what the camera could, or would
not, and did, or did not, show in the camps. This is to say that Human Rights only emerged as a
universalist defense of material necessities because the camera made visible a violation of more
than political rights and necessitated new language, and rights, by which to defend and describe
what had occurred. The camera not only visualized people stripped of their political and social
rights to ‘life, liberty, and freedom’, but asked spectators to bear witness to violations of rights
that did not yet exist, of events to which there were not yet words. The camera produced “a
painful proximity to that which genocide puts into motion: the reduction of Human Life to mere
matter’...‘people brought down to the lowest common denominator of organic life, people treated
as things that have neither body nor soul”2, or put another way, the camera made a visual case for
how political rights were not a strong enough metric by which to determine, describe, or even
hold in the mind what had occurred. These were people, who in addition to being stripped of
their political rights, had been stripped of all the material necessities of life which the
constitutions of Europe had not considered to include in their declaration. The camera, however,
made the loss of those rights, of the right to living, visually, not verbally or textually, apparent; a
distinction which forms the core of Human Rights. Photographs allowed for a space of judgment
to be constructed where witnesses could, in a way not allotted by any other representational
medium, attempt to make sense of the horrors of the holocaust.
For rights to emerge from pictures, the camera had to first hold a firm position as
evidentiary and uncorrectable true. That is to say, the historical position of the camera as an
2

Sliwinski, Human Rights in Camera,134-35.
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incorruptible pure object of vision3, which rendered the world in the objective hand of light,
rather than the subjective hand of the artist, witness, or survivor, allowed for a new claim of
rights to be made; a claim which could, and had not, been made in the witnessing of atrocities
through other mediums. Human Rights, then, are not only emergent from pictures but are
themselves photographic. While claims to a truthful photographic indexicality can best be
attested to the 19th-century positivist dream of the camera as a “universal mimetic
language’...which ‘yielded up a higher, more cerebral truth, a truth that could be uttered in the
universal language of mathematics’”; such a dream, as I will outline, has always been only that, a
dream. In reality pictures have always been firmly discursive objects of vision which derive
meaning from their joining with words. Nonetheless, without such a construction Human Rights
may not have emerged as they did. Or, to put it differently, if photography had been understood
as a discursive object, akin to how Alun Sekula outlines it always has been4, there would have
been no foundational ontological conception of the ‘human’ upon which inalienable and
universal rights could be built.
Chapter one begins with the early deployment of photography to the battlefields of the
18th century. It was in the battlefields of the Crimean war and the American civil war that
photography was first asserted as visualizing a wholly new Indexical vision. Positivists of the
time quickly asserted that the camera produces a novel form of vision because, unlike traditional
representation, photographs were the product of only light and chemicals. This view assumed the
camera's vision as incorruptibly truthful, however, most of these early canonical war photos, as
we will see, have been proven to be ‘frauds’. In considering why some of these early pictures

3

Azoulay, Ariella. The Civil Contract of Photography. New York : Cambridge, Mass: Zone Books ;
Distributed by The MIT Press, 2008.
4
Sekula, Allan. “Dismantling Modernism, Reinventing Documentary (Notes on the Politics of
Representation).” The Massachusetts Review 19, no. 4 (Winter 1978): 859–83.
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were staged we will also see where the camera's indexicality proved to be a limit, rather than the
source of its vision. It was in this period that the limits, and capabilities, of the camera's vision
were defined.
Chapter two will outline how the emergence of Human Rights must be attested to the
aesthetic experience of spectators bearing witness, in photographs, to the atrocities of World War
II. Rather than testifying to a more traditional legalistic, declarative, or liberalist history of rights,
where the arrival at Human Rights represents the great moral success of Western Europe, I will
attest to a pictorial trail which outlines a history where “opposed [sic] to humans simply being
free and equal in dignity and rights, such a focus shows that individuals must be judged human in
order to enjoy the benefits associated with this title”5. By critically reading Lee Miller's images
of World War II, specifically the liberation of the Bergen-Belson and Dachau concentration
camps, as well as the Soviet Extraordinary commissions forensic photographs of ‘yars’ (pits)
which where the primary sight of Nazi violence in eastern Europe, this chapter will outline how
Human Rights emerged from the judgment of spectators bearing witness to unknowable
atrocities, which necessitated new formulations of rights and language to make sense of what had
occurred. Pictures, when words failed, where able to make visual sense of the Holocaust. So
while the Holocaust represented a moment of complete and utter social breakdown, the rendering
of Human life to its bare nakedness, pictures allowed for a space, a critical distance, to be opened
between spectators and the corpses and survivors of the Final Solution. This is tall to say, Human
Rights were constructed in the space which emerges between the spectating witnesses of the
world and the subjects of the camera's vision. Millers images of the holocaust, most notably the
images she took from within the corpse filled train cars in Dachau, bore witness and made real a
place “filled with nameless dread’ where attroctiries had occoured ‘for which there was not yet
5

Sliwinski, Human Rights in Camera, 25.
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langauge”6.The photographs of the Holocaust, implicitly, set the stage for the rise of a wholly
new set of rights which would, in the future, be mobilized to defend those material necessities
which made Human life possible.
Finally, chapter 3 will outline how governments have, over the past three decades, taken
drastic steps to weaponize the camera. Most of the advances, however, have been made in
response to honorific usage of the image, specifically, as an attempt to gain control over the
political community of spectators which has emerged as a legitimate, and powerful, political
body whose collective conscience is bound up in the aesthetic experience unique to looking at
photographs of atrocity. If discourses of Human Rights are what made necessary the presence
of a camera in war we must also interrogate how the relationship between photography and
Human Rights has become so ubiquitous. As I will argue, the state's obsession with expanding its
ability to reproduce, create, and take images is a direct response to the emergence of a global,
politically active, community of spectators who make political, democratic, and social choices in
response to their Aesthetic encounter with images; most importantly in the defense of Human
Rights. will bring into question the validity of the cameras claim to an indexical vision.
The core of each of these chapters is a series of photos which each bear witness to many
forms of atrocity. However, what unites all of them is an overarching argument that Human
Rights are not only photographic, but, it could be said, exist only in the world of photographs.
Therefor, outlining why photographs have come to be ubiquitous with the visualizations of war,
violence, and genocide will prove a necessary endeavor for properly understanding Human
Rights as photographic. Or to put it another way, if photographs are the only way through which
rights were first imagined, remain defensible, and are made legitimate then could it be said that
rights only exist in the false two dimensionality of the photographed world? It is no secret, then,
6

Sliwinski, 100.
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why communities that defend and make claims to Human Rights heavily, if not solely, utilize the
camera to make those claims, it is, so to speak, a natural occurrence.
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We want the photographer to be a spy in the house of love and of death.
~Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others.

Chapter One
Dreams of a Universal Language
Visions of war have become so ubiquitous with images of dead bodies, disfigured
civilians, destroyed buildings, and aerial bombardments it becomes easy to forget this is a
relatively modern engagement of photographic deployment of the battlefield. The vast pictorial
rolodex of war has, as Sontag writes, historically offered “mostly positive images of the
warrior’s trade, and of the satisfactions of starting a war’...‘if governments had their way, war
photography; like most war poetry, would drum of support for soldiers' sacrifice.’”7 Indeed, the
pictorial trail of Human Rights begins where spectators first bore witness to war, not in pictures
which were critical of its violence, but rather, “with such a mission, with such disgrace.”8 One of
the first deployments of photography to the battlefield was Roger Fenton's dispatch to the
Crimean war in 1855. Fenton, was arguably the first photojournalist to enter the battlefield and
“no less than the war’s ‘official’ photographer”. Sent on the behalf of the British government, at
the behest of prince Albert, Fentons photographic engagement with the war was primarily a ruse
to counteract “the alarming printed accounts of the unanticipated risk and privations endured by
the British soldiers dispatched there the previous year”9, the camera was deployed to the
battlefield with the expectation photographs would provide irrefutable evidence against a critical
press. Most notably, the highly regarded, and picture-less, London Newspaper The Times was
7

Sontag, Susan. Regarding the Pain of Others. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2003, 48.
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
8
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heavily critical of what had widely been regarded as an irresponsible military leadership, which
had drawn out the war, and caused a formidable loss of British life on the peninsula. As sontag
outlines, the war in Crimea was “more than news...it was bad news”10, and the death toll “from
causes other than combat was horrendous - twenty-two thousand died of illnesses; many
thousands lost limbs to frostbite during the long Russian winter of the protracted siege of
Sebastopol - and several of the military engagements were disasters.”11 This is all to say, that the
war had become wildly unpopular amongst the british public, Fenton’s photographs were
intended to reassure said public that the cost was worth it.
Paradoxically, Fenton was “under instructions from the War Office to photograph the
dead, the maimed, or the ill” and given the mechanical limits of the camere any honorific glory
of action on the front was rendered impossible to picture. Perhaps this is an early sign of the
aesthetic weariness photographers, and spectors, have often experienced in photographic death.
While large scale paintings of the glory and honor of conflict had long been a common feature of
romantic and historical paintings, and was common during Fenton’s time as well, the camera was
regarded to be incapable of producing such visions.12 If one pays attention, however, in these
paintings it is only the enemies who are dead. Perhaps as a sign of the wickedness of the cameras
indexicality not even the bodies of the enemies where shown, in fact, not a single picture of
death, bodily harm, or any of the negative accusations of the press was photographed. Violence
or the witnessing death or the dead,was not the problem, rather, there was something in the
coldness of silver which made death somehow more disturbing in pictures than paintings.

10

Sontag, 49.
Ibid.
12
For examples of painting romanticized vision of war see: “Battle of Marengo, 14 June 1800”, Louis
Francois Lejuene, 1802; “Battle of the Alma, September 20, 1854; Crimean War”, Eugène Louis Lami,
1855; and, “The Death of General Warren at the Battle of Bunker’s Hill, 17 June, 1775”, John Trumbull,
1815-1831.
11
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Photography was quickly theorized as having more in common with the absolute truths of
mathematics, chemistry, and physics than the subjective, and by contrast fictitious, hand of the
printmaker, painter, or artists. Henry Fox Talbot, an early inventor of paper printing methods,
furthered this assumption in“The Pencil of Nature'', he writes;
The term “Photography” is now so well known, that an explanation of it is perhaps
superfluous; yet, as some persons may still be unacquainted with the art, even by name,
its discovery being still of very recent date, a few words may be looked for of
general explanation. It may suffice, then, to say, that the plates of this work have
been obtained by the mere action of Light upon sensitive paper. They have been formed
or depicted by optical and chemical means alone, and without the aid of any one
acquainted with the art of drawing. It is needless, therefore, to say that they differ in all
respects, and as widely us possible, in their origin, from plates of the ordinary kind,
which owe their existence to the united skill of the Artist and the Engraver. They are
impressed by Nature's hand; and what they want as yet of delicacy and finish of
execution arises chiefly from our want of sufficient knowledge of her laws. When we
have learnt more, by experience, respecting the formation of such pictures, they will
doubtless be brought much nearer to perfection; and though we may not be able to
conjecture with any certainty what rank they may hereafter attain to as pictorial
productions, they will surely find their own sphere of utility, both for completeness of
detail and correctness of perspective.13
Talbot outlined that photographs represented a superior form of vision, functionally,
because they spoke through the ‘nature's hand’, and by extension, the holy immutable language
of God. As deriving its vision from mechanical means, as Allan Sekula outline, photography
came to represent “a new legalistic truth, the truth of an indexical rather than textual inventory”
where the camera, uniquely, is able ‘to claim the legal status of a visual document of
ownership’”14. What early expectations of photographic truth represent is a recognition of “a new
instrumental potential in photography: a silence that silences..”The presence of human influence
on representation in contrast to the harsh indexicality of the camera began to be regarded with
suspicion. The hand of the artist, then, was constructed as contaminating an image's claim to an

13

Talbot, William Henry Fox. The Pencil of Nature. KWS Publishers, in association with National Media
Museum, 2011.
14
Sekula, Allan. “The Body and the Archive.” October 39 (Winter 1986), 6.
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objective truth. In fact, objectivity in representation was eclipsed by the wholly new indexicality
of the camera. As the technology of the camera increases then one would expect that the vision it
produces would consistently require less and less interpretation, or textual context, to imbue it
with meaning. Squeezing more visual data in a picture frame does not, paradoxically, result in a
better understanding of what the camera shows.
In the battlefield, however, the camera was limited both by the mecha-chemical functions
of its process, as well as, spectators' judgement that such a vision of the dead violated social
conventions of the time. That is to say, rather than producing irrefutable evidence of the war, as
many early practitioners speculated, the camera's indexicality became the limit of its vision. The
vast majority of the images Fenton produced during his four-month stay, did not depict the glory,
honor, or triumph of the British, in fact as Sontag writes, they depicted very little of the battle at
all;
His pictures are tableaux of military life behind the front lines; the war-movement,
disorder, drama-stays off camera. The one photography Fenton took in the Crimea that
reached beyond benign documentation is ‘The Valley of the Shadow of Death,’ whose title
evokes the consolation offered by the biblical psalmist as well as the disaster of the
previous October in which six hundred British soldiers were ambushed on the plan above
Balaklava-Tennyson called the site the ‘valley of death’ in his memorial poem ‘The
Charge of the Light Brigade.’ Fenton’s memorial photograph is a portrait is a portrait of
absence, of death without the dead. It is the only photograph he took that would not have
needed to be staged, for all it shows is a wide rutted road studded with rocks and
cannonballs that curves onward across a barren rolling plain to the distant void.15
However, Fenton made another version of “In the Valley of the Shadow of Death” that day;
where the road is clean from debris and easily passable. Only what Errol Morris calls the“good
Fenton photograph, honest and unadorned by a desire for contrivance or misdirection”16(Fig 1)

15

16

Morris, Errol. “Which Came First, the Chicken or the Egg? (Part One).” The New York Times,
September 25, 2007.
https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/which-came-first-the-chicken-or-the-egg-part-one/.
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image would eventually be printed in the British paper The Daily News on September 20, 185517.
The second image, “the bad Fenton photograph’...‘corrupted by the sleight of hand, the trick, the
calculated deception”18(Fig 2) was never publicly displayed and wasn’t widely published until
the former curator of photography at the Victoria & Albert galleries in London, Mark
Haworth-Booth, uncovered it in the 1980’s (who Sontag cites in Regarding the Pain of Others).
This revelation, that one of the earliest documentary photographs of war might have been staged,
signifies a very destabilizing reveal for a medium which has historically been regarded as
‘incorruptibly’ truthful. If Fenton had arranged his historic picture, placed the cannonballs on the
road himself, much of the positivist view of photography as historically, and presently, inherently
objective would prove to be a mirage. Furthermore, if Fenton altered the image, imbued it with
his aesthetic or artistic desires, then the early belief in photograph's duty to record as the “eye of
history” would also be but to test19.
Indexically, that is visually Fentons picture
reveals very little. If one were to come across
this picture, eyes first so-to-speak, devoid of
context and caption one would only see two
barren hillsides scattered with debris and
bisected by the road. It is through the
interjection of context, by way of textual and
historical knowledge, that one can begin to
see what Fenton intended for the picture to show, that is, the “landscape, [where] the Light
Brigade made its doomed charge” and 600 British soldiers died. While Fenton’s images could be
17

Ibid.
Morris, “Which Came First, the Chicken or the Egg? (Part One),” 13.
19
Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 52.
18
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described as only visualizing the leftovers of the Crimean War, “a portrait of absence, of death
without the dead'', this does not mean the opposite, images of corpses, bayonet charges, and
exploding shells would have necessarily been regarded by the public as reasons to end the war20 .
These images, alongside Sontag's analysis, make clear that images are not made devoid of the
context of the surrounding world, rather, “the meaning of the photograph, then[sic], does not lie
exclusively in the image, but in the conjunction of image and text. Two discourses [sic]-the
discourse of written language and the discourse of photography - are required to produce and
‘fix’ the meaning [of photography]” 21; and regardless of “whether the photograph is understood
as a naive object or the work of an experienced artificer, its meaning-and the viewer’s
response-depends on how the picture is identified or misidentified; that is, on words”22. This is
all to say that while Fenton’s shows very little, a road, some rocks, and some cannonballs, the
picture can mean more
than the sum of its parts.
Indexicality, then, is not
a firm immovable
representation of the
world, rather, is the
result of the binding of a
vast web of processes,
actors, reactions, and
aesthetic desires.

20

Ibid, 50.
Hall, Stuart. “Representation,” n.d., 28.
22
Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others, 29.
21
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Expanding to a broader view of these early photographs to include the Brady war pictures taken
during the American Civil war, Felice Beato's documentation of the Sepoy Rebellion in British
occupied India (1858) and the Second Opium war in China (1860), as well as the photographs
utilized by the reform campaigners of the Congo Reform Association (CRA) and the missionary
photographs of Alice and John Seely Harris; reveals that the camera was widely engaged in
documenting the violent conflicts of the 19th century. What this expansive view also outlines is
how, when picturing violence, photographs are never solely indexical, rather, they have always
been discursive objects of vision utilized in tandem with, and supported by, a textual practice.
Nearly all of the most ‘iconographic’ photographs of war from the 1850’s to the end of the
century where after-the-battle images and many of them, we will see, have been revealed to be
faked. However, we must interrogate why the reveal of an images forgery, the fact that it was
tampered with, is often quite a scandal for witnesses who believed it to be real. Additionally, and
perhaps more importantly, interrogating why photographers choose to construct pictures will
shed light on how a picture's meaning is not dependent, solely, on its indexicality.

In the Valley of the Shadow of Truth
While Fenton’s images mark the first engagement of the camera in war, it should be
noted that in Crimea the camera was mobilized in the defense of a vast military failure, as such,
the dead did not make an appearance. It was not until three years later that the photographer
Felice Beato in documenting a vicious exaction of British colonial might after the sepoy
rebellion of 1857-58 would the ultimate cost of war, the dead, would be photographed. Beato
was celebrating a “fierce victory of the British army over a mutiny of native soldiers under its
command, the first important challenge to British rule in India. The arresting photography Beato
took in Lucknow of the Sikandarbagh Palace, gutted by the British bombardment, shows the
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courtyard strewn with rebels’ bones.” 23 Beatos image “[Interior of Secundrabagh After the
Massacre], 1858-1862” (Fig 3) was indeed a place where mass violence had been committed,
however, while the rebellion took place in November of 1857, “after which the victorious British
troops and loyal Indian units searched the palace room by room, bayoneting the eighteen
hundred surviving Sepoy defenders’...‘throwing their bodies into the courtyard; vultures and
dogs did the rest’”24; Beato made this image in the spring of ‘58. The cameras indexical vision in
the courtyard legitimized his constructed, false, scene of horror as historical fact, when in reality,
it was Beato who scattered the bones and remains for the camera. This is not to say that his
forgery lessens the potency of the image as historical documentation of British colonial crimes,
rather, it points to how the camera can, through the joining of different meanings, testify to
alternate histories and radically different projects. Beatos imagine, that is, at the time of its

23
24

Sontag, 51.
Ibid, 54
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creation was constructed in support of the British occupation, in looking at the history of colonial
violence the cameras indexicality actually, it could be argued, depicts two crimes; the slaughter
of the Sepoy guards who had surrendered as well as a complete disregard for the remains of the
dead.
However, for the colonial powers of Europe, the camera's ability to appear objective and
impartial would serve as a fundamental tool to uphold binaries of colonial power. Additionally,
the reproducibility of the medium allowed for the empire to be brought home, not in the brutality
or violence of occupation-as happened in the two worlds wars-but in the gallery, archives, and
homes of settlers and the colonially fed cities of Europe. As Henry Louis Gates, citing Anne
McClintock argues, “the Victorian middle-class home became a space for the display of imperial
spectacle and the reinvention of race, while colonies - in particular Africa - became a theatre for
exhibiting the Victorian cult of domesticity and the reinvention of gender”. Photography made
legible, without leaving Europe, the divisions of colonialism which gave these cities their wealth
and power; images were brought of the glorious, but terrifying, natural world that stone and
lumber protected the soft human body from; colonial wars became an object to touch and hold,
subjugation became an object of study and looking, and while the vastness of the globe came
into focus the camera served as a legitimizer and commissioner of colonial domination.
Not long after the Sepoy rebellion, the outbreak of the American Civil war would also
mark the first full scale employment of photography in the documentation of the war in full. A
group of northern photographers headed by Mathew Brady - but mostly taken by Alexander
Gardner and Timothy O’Sullivan - produced a wide ranging archive of the war which included
“conventional subjects such as encampments populated by officers and foot soldiers, towns in
war’s way, ordnance, ships, as well as, most famously, dead Union and Confederate soldiers
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lying on the blasted ground of Gettysburg and Antietam.” 25 These pictures, which would come to
be known as the Brady war pictures, legitimized their brutal pictures of dead soldiers - which
until then had been boundary photographers were unwilling to pass - by attesting to a constructed
responsibility to record history. In two of the most well known Brady pictures, “A Harvest of
Death, Gettysburg, Pa., 1863” (fig 4) and “On the Antietam Battlefield, 1862” (fig 5), the center
field of the cameras vision is littered with the unknown bodies of fallen soldiers. The captions
only inform the location of the dead; it does not, surprisingly, distinguish if these Union are
Confederate soldiers. Given that access to the battlefield was extended to Bard and his team by
Lincoln Himself, one would have expected that the images would be produced in support of the
Union effort by only showing dead confederate soldiers. However, unlike Fenton Brady and his
team were not commissioned as supporting evidence for the war, rather, Bradys purpose for
documenting the war was simply the duty to record.
Brady famously wrote in Gardner’s photographic sketch book of the War (1866), where
this vast archive of the dead was presented, that pictures convey “a useful history'' by showing
“the blank horror and reality of war, in opposition to its pageantry’...‘Here are the dreadful
details! Let them aid in preventing such another calamity from falling upon the nation.’”26 The
responsibility to witness, to document history, here is invoked “in the name of realism, [which]
permitted-required-[one] to show unpleasant, hard facts”, as Sontag outlined.27 In evoking an
emergent responsibility to history, which did not exist, and imagining a community of witnesses,
which had not yet emerged, Brady’s photograph function in much the same way that “the
emergence of the concept of crimes against humanity’ over a century later was ‘presupposes the
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prior emergence of humanity as such’”28. Or to put in another way, the Brady war pictures
produced both objects of witnessing and the responsibility to witness.
It would seem highly unlikely then, that Bardy and his team, given their staunch
alignment to realism, would have taken steps to alter any of their photos. However, it is now
known, that “Home of a rebel sharpshooter, Gettysburg, 1863” (fig 5), was in fact a fully staged
picture where the body of the confederate soldier was dragged from wherever he had fallen to
this cove (most likely because the hideout was more photogenic than the fields of the dead) and a
rifle had been propped up as if it had fallen from the man's dying hands. (“It seems not to have
been the special rifle a sharpshooter would have used, but a common infantryman’s rifle;
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Gardner didn’t know or didn’t care.”)29. Bearing bare witness, it would seem, was not enough for
Brady's team. Perhaps it is not so hard to understand why. After bearing witness to two of the
bloodiest battles of the war, 51,000 casualties at Gettysburg and 22,000 at Antietam, it would not
seem unlikely that Brady and his team would try to make sense of the war, rather than simply
record the dead. Their staging of the scene, then, could be better understood as evidence for the
limits of the camera's indexicality. Brady’s act of forgery, if we can call it that, then is an attempt
to find meaning from the immensity of violent conflict. This is to say, pictures of dead soldiers,
the-after-pictures- of war, alone don’t actually make sense of the dead. Indexicality does lead to
fixed meaning.
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However, the knowledge that the Brady image, or any of these pictures for that matter,
where constructed does not significantly diminish their importance or meaning. The uncovering
of these scenes as being staged for the camera,paradoxically, helps to make a very tricky thing
clear; all pictures are, to some extent, ‘forgeries’. Not in the sense that they produce new realities
out of thin air, rather, all pictures are the result of distinguished moments being selected from a
regime of other, similar moments, by the photographer-or camera- to produce a specific meaning.
What is ‘forged’ in all photos is not what they show, or the world is visualized, but rather, the
meaning with which that specific moment is imbued.

Dilley 26

Meaning does not derive exclusively from what the picture shows “but in the conjunction
of image and text’ in fact ‘two discourses-the discourse of written language and the discourse of
photography - are required to produce and ‘fix’ the meaning.’”30 Fixating, solely, on the content
of the photograph, paired with a materialist focus on images as “nothing more than silver halide
crystals arranged on paper or…‘nothing more than a concatenation of 1’s and 0’s resident on a
hard-drive”31leads towards an assumption that the problems of representation arise not from a
“collective need to endow photographs with intentions” where meaning is produced, but rather
from indexical vision of the camera.32 Meaning, however, does not derive from the camera's
vision, nor can it be fixed, as Stuart Hall outlines “meaning is highly ambiguous’...‘there is no
one, true meaning. Meaning ‘floats.’”33An important distinction must be made between the
content of the two photographs as opposed to their shared nature as images.
This is to say that photographs are rendered true or false not from the object of their
vision or as a product of certain mechanical, chemical, or digital processes; but rather, through
their interplay with specific institutions or groups who hold epistemological ability to ‘read’ an
image and determine its legitimacy. This process, as Stuart Hall outlines, results in a “Gain[ing]
in meaning when they [images] are read in context, against or in connection with one another.
This is another way of saying that images do not carry meaning or ‘signify’ on their own. They
accumulate meanings, or play off their meanings against one another, across a variety of texts
and media. Each image carries its own, specific meaning”34. Halls text reminds us that
photography never has fixed meaning, so while fentons images could be ‘false’ and claimed
other wise and Casements images could be ‘true’ but claimed to be false, neither can serve as
30

Hall, “Representation,”228.
Morris, “Which Came First, the Chicken or the Egg? (Part One).”11.
32
Ibid, 21.
33
Hall, “Representation”, 228.
34
Ibid.
31

Dilley 27

testaments to a ‘nature’ of photography because photographs ‘meaning’ derives from its context,
from the combining of “the discourse of written language and the discourse of photography” to
produce the meaning of the image. Hall's text redirects critiques of photography away from
narratives of truth/falsity towards an epistemological problem of who gets to decide meaning and
who then meaning may serve, a practice Eyal Weizzman terms as verification; “not as a noun or
as an essence, but as a practice, one that is contingent, collective, and poly-perspectival.”35
Perhaps this inability to ‘fix’ meaning is what leads to our collective dismay when images
are inevitably revealed to have been staged. As Sontag famously writes;
The Photographs we are particularly dismayed to have been posed are those that appear
to roced romantic climaxes, above all, of love and death’...Robert Doisneau never
explicitly claimed snapshot status for a photography taken in 1950 for Life of a young
couple kissing on the sidewalk near Paris’s Hotel De Ville. Still, the revelation more than
forty years later that the picture was a directorial setup was a woman and a man hired for
the day to smooch for doisneau provoked many a spasm of chagrin among those for
whom it is a cherished vision of romantic love and romantic Paris.36
In a sense, these moment’s when the content of the picture is revealed to have been
staged for the camera we are given a look into the backstage of the photo. Rather than the cold
hard indexicality of positivism we are greeted with the decidedly human presence of the
photographer, and, like Dorothy drawing back the curtain of Oz, we are dismayed to find only
light and mirrors, there is no magic.
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The Chiasmus of Rights
Across the Atlantic, Frederick Douglas, in addition to utilizing text and speech to fight
for the abolition of the slave trade, heavily utilized photography as a tool to fight for freedom37.
He understood that to fight in the political sphere, in a world with access to photography, too
meant to fight first and foremost in the visual sphere38. He utilized photography, specifically
self-portraits, so heavily that he became the most photographed man of the 19th century. Y
Douglas’s work as an abolitionist revolved on the axis of a chiasmus the “repeating [of] two or
more words or clauses or grammatical constructions, balanced against each other in reverse
order, a rhetorical “x”, somewhat akin to a linguistic seesaw: ‘You have seen how a man was
made a slave; you shall see how a slave is made a man’”39. The technical functioning of a
camera's prism, taking something right side up, inverting it, to reproduce it in positive once
more, functions by the same pretense. Douglass utilized images of himself to invert and provide
visual testimony which inverted racist associations “showing that we had gotten these
associations wrong all along, that there was nothing natural or fixed about them after all; that
they were constructed, arbitrary, and, infact, evil perversions of the natural order of things in
which all men and women are meant to have equal rights” . Douglas’s work towards abolition
was rooted in an engagement of photography as a part of a “war over the representation of the
black subject’ seeing ‘much more clearly than many of his colleagues that no single text, no
single photograph, no single word nor image, could stanch the Niagara flow of stereotypes that
American society would call upon to do the symbolic work of a mode of economic
neoslavery’...‘if racist imagery could not be crushed, they could be countered, and countered
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with force40’”. While the cameras' indexicality have proven to be a limit in making sense of war
for Douglas, however, the camera's stirt vision proved to be the foundation of his abolitionist
framework precisely because meaning could not be fixed. Douglas recognized, before most, that
the relationship between what the camera pictures and what the image means are not mutually
exclusive.
In the fight for abolition photography was put to task to strike down the “storehouse of
racist stereotypes that had been accumulated in the American archive of antiblack imagery”, for
the goal of abolition the subjectivity of the camera became not only the object of focus, but the
foundation on abolitionists who mounted their claims to “a common humanity, and therefore the
rights to freedom and citizenship and economic opportunity”41. However, the meaning of images
can never be permanently fixed, as Stuart Hall reminds us, however it is possible to overcome
certain “regime[s] of representation” and for images to be reconstituted with newly forged
meaning”42. This representational practice, which in the case of Douglas’s images constitutes a
battle against the racialized regime of representation in the United States, relied on the fact that
meaning could not be rooted to a picture . It was specifically the medium's unmoored relation to
meaning which allowed Douglas to counteract the racist visual regimes of the United State. More
importantly, he relied on how photographic “meaning begins [sic]to slip and slide; it begins to
drift, or be wrenched, or infected into new directions’ and how this lubricated relation to
meaning allowed for ‘New meanings to be grafted on to old ones’”43. This is all to say, when
speaking of pictures mobilize in the defense of rights to assume that any picture can, alone, make
self evident the necessity for rights to be defended is extremely folly. Pictures do not mean
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anything alone, that much is clear looking at Douglas’s portraits, however, when furnished and
caught up in wider textual or orated claims to rights, photographs prove to be indisputable tools
for their defence.
Yet, pictures must be used with caution. In defending rights today and attempting to bring
cessations of violence it has become far too common that pictures of violence, which perhaps a
loose spattering of context and text, is enough to make the defence of rights self evident. All too
often well-meaning NGOs and humanitarian organisations confuse pictures of atrocity for a
defense of rights. Rather than render a defence of rights necessary and explicit, these pictures
typically, and uncritically, magnify violence while doing little, if anything, to actually lessen
violence. This is why we must avoid, at all costs, the individualist and positivistic cult of the
singular image. No such pure object of vision exists, and attempting to create-or find one-is a
venture doomed to fail because it refuses an engagement with the fact that not only has no such
image exists, but more importantly, that there is no ‘perfect’ moment for revolution and the
beginnings of a better world. The striving for justice has never come, as Douglas’s life lone
photographic project reminds us, because of one singular, lone moment or event. Pictures must
be understood not as the silver bullet for progress, but rather, as an immensely powerful
representation tool which, nevertheless, must be utilized with care and trepidation. The camera
does not make rights evident and images may never stop violence, yet, it was in pictures
spectators first imagined Human Rights to be possible, and perhaps the role of photographs and
their spectators is still being written.
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Chapter 2
The Weight of Bearing Witness
Following a pictorial trail of the emergence of rights arrives, necessarily, at the end of
World War II where spectators in Europe and the United States bore witness to the horror of the
Holocaust before the words to express what had occurred came into being. The pictorial trail of
Human Rights simultaneously outlines what violence was considered ‘grave social breakdowns’,
the Holocaust and the World Wars, while also attesting, by way of their absence, to what forms
violence had not only been overlooked but had become foundational to the Nation-states of the
west. The lacking presence of Human Rights before the Holocaust must then be attested not to
the absence of the camera's vision, but rather, to the fact that the structural violence which built,
financed, and furnished the Western nation-state project had been rendered the norm. To be
precise, the long-standing violence of Europe's genocidal colonial projects was finally ‘brought
home’ during World War II; and was well poised to meet it. Perhaps, then, we should ask; where
are the pictures of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Nanking, Guernica, Leningrad, or Dresden? Where
was the camera when the structures of the Final Solution were first constructed on the
Reservations, along the Trail of Tears, and in the Plantation? In addition, we might ask, Why did
Human Rights not emerge from the photographs of the Belgian atrocities in the Congo, the
German genocide of the Herero and Namaqua, or American Lynchings? This is to say that the
camera constructed the violence of the Holocaust as a unique, uncommon, and historically
unprecedented moment of grave social breakdown; when it should be understood as the logical
conclusion of the European settler colonial project.
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The photos of the gate at Auschwitz and the death train in Dachau came, in a sense, to
represent the whole of the atrocity. In turn, these images and spaces became iconographic of the
whole of Nazi war crimes and, by extension, the measuring stick against which all genocides are
measured against. The problem with this formulation, as the Extraordinary Commission photos
remind, is that the place where atrocities are committed is not always so well-formed to become
iconographic beneath the photographic gaze as a gate that reads “Work will set you free”.
However, as David Shneer lays out, the structure of the Final Solution was drastically different
across the territories of the Third Reich, a historical fact which, throughout my limited public
education of the Holocaust, is not often attested to. This may be, in part, that images made in the
liberation of the Western Front are simultaneous rejections to the success of the Final solution, in
showing the survivors of the camp, and relatively simple visual objects to explain the vicious
machine of the Holocaust. Yet, these images, as often happens between the image and history,
have only reconstructed a part of the forms of killing which supported the Final Solution;
Visually, the Holocaust in the Soviet Union looks nothing like it looked in France,
Germany, Poland, Hungary, or elsewhere. Trains haunt the Western imagination for their
connotation of deportations nach Osten, ‘‘to the east.’’ The Soviet Union was the East, in
fact even farther east than the nightmarish East of Poland that was the Germans’
euphemism for death. And there, east of East, it is not the technology of murder that
haunts. It is the natural landscape itself. If images of the gates of Auschwitz, taken by
Soviet liberator-photographers in January and February 1945, seared the Western
imagination, the thousands of photographs of forests, ravines, and trenches taken by those
same photographers of liberation sites on Soviet soil lie fallow in archives. No searing, no
iconic imagery.44
The liberation of the Western Front brought a deluge of reportage on what was being uncovered
as the war drew to its close. In the summer of 1945 Allied publics became well acquainted with
the mass manufacture of corpses in the Nazi’s Final Solution primarily in radio feeds, eye
witness reports, survivors testimony, and the mass circulation of photographs both in print media,
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and in gallery exhibitions which tens of thousands attended45.Yet, while “the public bore witness
in 1945, but they did not know what they had seen”46, neither the reporting nor the pictures were
able to make sense of what had occurred under Nazi rule.
While the camera had long been regarded as being able to succeed when words were not
enough, in the camps the camera alone could not make sense of what transpired. Here, the
indexical qualities of the camera proved utterly insufficient to communicate what had transpired.
This was not because the camera could not physically render images of corpses, prisoners, and
the infrastructure of the final solution, but rather, there could be no captions to describe, inform,
or legitimize what the camera had rendered; the language had not yet been invented. As Sharon
Slinwski outlines “during this period, pictorial evidence came to outweigh all other forms of
testimony”47 for the journalist, governments, and citizens trying to make sense of the camps.
Factual knowledge of what had transpired in the camps, as communicated by Nazi ledgers, was
not enough to communicate the atrocities; “indeed, the public rejected the first news about the
Nazi ledgers because the enormity of what the reports signified could not be accepted without
destroying the prevailing worldview”48. As famously stated by Edward R. Murrow: “I have
reported what I saw and heard, but only part of it. For most of it, I have no words”; where words
failed, the image prospered in reproducing and visualizing the atrocities of Nazi crimes. As the
war drew to a close revealing the full extent of Third Reich’s atrocities, allied publics responded
by leaning more and more on the indexical quality of the camera to tell them what happened. So
much so that “it did not seem to matter that the images sometimes went without proper captions
or were presented out of context to the times and places in which they had been taken’...‘In many
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cases, the images were so devoid of identifiable details, it was difficult to anchor them in a given
time or geographic place. Yet the broader the horror the photographs could invoke, the more
vociferous the public judgment”49. What emerged was a vast photographic catalogue which
assumed the indexical nature of the camera could, when brought into the camps, make sense of
these atrocities in a way words, testimonies, and radio reports could not.
While this factual usage of the camera did convince many of what occurred, it could not
make sense of the atrocities which spectators were brought into close proximity to. In part this is
due to the representational problem in photographing the Holocuas where the ultimate goal was
of course, the eradication of both European Jews as well as the knowledge, evidence, and
remnants of their existence both as living people and in visual testimony, as such, the Nazi’s
went to extensive lengths to limit the possibilities of European Jews being photographed dead, or
alive. Parts of the Holocaust, simply, could not be photographed. As the allied forces began
advancing East the Germans made attempts to obscure and obliterate any evidence of their
crimes through mass burials of bodies, the scattering of ashes, and dynamiting many of the gas
chambers, crematoriums, and camps themselves. When allied forces did finally liberate the
camps some, but not all, of the visible evidence of Nazi crimes no longer stood. The presence of
the camera came to signify the failure of the Final solution because it provided irrefutable
evidence that a crime was beyond the pale of what contemporary communities could understand.
While contemporary witnesses now know the primary target of the Final Solution to be
the Jewish people the same can not be said of witnessing publics in 1945, this fact was not made
visible by the camera. More often than not radio reports, politicians, and printed news media all
commonly referred to the people in the camps as “German political prisoners”, with the caption
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of “Jewish people'' rarely appearing. This is due, in part, as Sliwinski citing Peter Novick attests
to the fact that;
Since the time of its official pronouncement at the Wannsee Conference, held January
20th, 1942, the ‘Final Solution to the Jewish Question’ was deliberately opaque. Near the
end of the war, this deliberate obfuscation included targeting the remaining Jews in the
camps, so by the time American and British troops entered the western camps in April
1945, the majority of the surviving prisoners were not, in fact, Jewish. The massive
camps in the east, which were composed almost entirely of Jews, had either been closed
by the time the Allies arrived, or, as in the case of Auschwitz-Birkenau, were liberated by
the Soviets with few American or British reporters present.50
This dreadful absence which haunted the liberation of the camps was invisible to the camera of
allied photojournalists who under deadlines and editorial commands to capture the ‘camps’ in
their entirety could not step back, so to speak, and utilize the camera as a forensic tool, like the
Soviet photographers in the Eastern front, to construct the site of a crime. Rather, allied
photographers began to blur the lines between journalism and so-called ‘art’ photography 51.
Unlike the Soviet Exceptional Commission, which was convened with the expectation that the
camera was producing evidence for a courtroom where Nazi crimes would be put on trial, the
role of Allied photographers was explicitily to support the western ideals of glory, liberty, and
righteousness which supported the war effort by driving the sale of war bonds, solidifying
political power, and drumming up patriotic support.
Perhaps most effectively the rejection of the cameras journalistic or documentarian
indexically, in favor of its more emotionally charged artistic evocative possibilities, can be seen
in the reports and photographs of the American war correspondent, Lee Miller, more precisely in
her photographs of the liberation of Dachau in the summer of 1945. While her images of Dachau,
most notably her images of the Dachau death train, would come to be regarded as some of the
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most iconographic images of the Holocaust, her early images such as her photographs; Surgeon
and Anaesthetist (fig 1), Fall of the Citadel, Aerial bombardment (fig 2), and Untitled
(Saint-Malo Boot) (Fig 3); should be read simultaneosul photographic documents of the war as
well as artistic works that try to make sense of wanton destruction by way of subverting the
cameras indexically in favor of the evocations of its artistic practice. Miller's images did not
simply try to document the war, not in the formal journalistic sense that is, rather, she engaged
the camera as a means through which she could bear witness to, and make sense of, violence
which she could not understand; an endeavour which would remain impossible of being
complete. Before her arrival first at Buchenwald, and eventually, at Dachau, Miller was already
sharpening her aesthetic judgments and utilizing the camera to produce images that
simultaneously serve as testimony to World War II and exceed the formalism of bare evidence.

Rolleiflex Visions
In 1939 Lee Miller traveled to London to join her partner Roland Penrose, where the war
had passed from “uneasiness into impatient acceptance: the war of nerves had become the war of
Yawns as the city awaited Hitler’s imminent Blitzkrieg.”52 Miller spent her time as a fashion
photographer at British Vogue, however, her sights were set on the front, and by D-Day in the
summer of 1944, Miller had secured accreditation as a US correspondent and six weeks later
shipped out to army field camps in Normandy. She would shoot over 35 rolls of film and compile
a ten-thousand-word reportage on her first expedition to the front. Beginning that first report on
the field hospitals of Normandy, she writes;
“The surgical tent had a white floor and white walls, and white mosquito netting shut off
the vestibule from the operating tables. A wing opened out for the preparation of
dressings and instruments.’ … ‘Three patients were conscious. The far one was nearly
52
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completed; that is, his leg had been dealt with and clench-faced men were patting the last
of a plaster bandage in place. In the chiaroscuro of khaki and white I was reminded of
Hieronymus Bosch’s painting ‘The Carrying of the Cross’. He had watched me take his
photograph and had made an effort with his good hand to smooth his hair. I didn’t know
that he was already asleep with sodium pentathol when they started on his other arm. I
had turned away for fear my face would betray to him what I had seen”
The drama of the hospital to which Miller writes of, with a sense of partial disbelief, completely
astounded the editors of Vogue who ran the full story, titled “Unarmed Warriors”, alongside
fourteen pictures in the August issue in 1944.. In, Surgeon and Anaesthetist (fig 1), there is a
timidness to her witnessing which is unique to her earliest pictures, however, she does not shy
away from the dram of the Boschian 'chiaroscuro of khaki and white’. The faces of the surgeons
are obscured by deep black shadows and the low angle completely obscures the body of whoever
is lying on the operating table,
while the outline of the
surgeons tower, the hunches
and poses accentuated by the
harsh light of the operating
room. Yet, the presence of an
artist behind the camera here is
diminished by her reliance on
the indexicality of the camera to
reproduce the scene of the
operation room, and her artistic
reference primarily remains in
her notes and texts. Here the camera becomes the primary source of evidence because it presents
a stark unbiased portrait of the war; the indexicality and the evidence of the photograph are what
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is important, less what it can evoke. These early images, despite her textual evocation of Bosch,
are firmly photojournalistic, in that they seek to inform readers of what life looking like on the
front One gets the sense that Miller, in Normandy at least, was bearing witness from behind the
camera rather than through it as she would later come to be known.
Rather than returning to London, Miller hitched a ride to the Western Front at the Siege
of St. Malo. Thanks to inconsistent reporting that St. Malo had already been liberated, and was
no longer an active sight of conflict, Miller was able to reach the front lines despite women
journalists not being allowed near active conflict.53 Rather than reach a newly liberated city
Miller arrived in St. Malo amid a brutal street-by-street conflict as Allied troops pushed towards
the citadel at the heart of the city.54 Despite finding herself embedded in the active conflict of the
Western Front, the majority of the only images she made of active conflict was the aerial
bombardment of the citadel taken from the serious distance of her hotel window. In Bombs
Bursting on the Cité d’Aleth (fig 2) the smoke of the bombing rises from the citadel, but no
bodies are shown, the force of the war on the physical body, for now at least, was not yet a figure
in Miller’s images. Most of her images are of abandoned dugouts, rubble-filled streets, and
battered troops. In a long lineage of photojournalism, dating back to Roger Fenton's images of
the Crimean War, these pictures are primarily concerned with the leftovers of conflict rather than
the upfront action shots which were popularized by Robert Capa in the Spanish Civil War.
However, her distance from the immediate sight of violence allowed her a critical space, both of
safety and vision, to begin pushing the boundaries of the Camera’s indexical capabilities. In Fall
of the Citadel, Aerial bombardment (fig 2), which bears a formal semblance to her earlier work
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of surrealism Portrait of Space (1937), Miller beings to lean into this critical distance employing
both the camera as both a journalistic tool to show that bombs were falling, while her ‘framing’
of the siege, within the window of her balcony, evokes an artistic suggestion to the uniqueness of
the event as seen through the camera rather than behind it. Her view from the balcony, and her
literal ‘framing’ of the
citadels bombardment,
can be read as an
invitation to viewers to
speculate, imagine
even, the sounds of the
blast, the scent of
gunpowder, and the
feeling of bombs
falling as shockwaves
rolled through the
city. In line with her
Surrealist sensibilities,
Miller also used the
camera as a way to
transfigure and mutate
her visions of the war in order to make sense of it. In Untitled (Saint-Malo Boot) (Fig 3), also
titled Boot and Ammunition, a belt of ammo sticks out an empty boot, evoking the bodies of the
dead, disfigured, and otherwise. In these early images Miller turns away from evidence,
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testimony, and fact, to fix her camera, as was a common practice of the surrealists, on the
abnormalities, contradictions, and beauties she encountered in the war. These early photos then
should be read not as testimonies to the war, or as historical evidence, but rather, a
documentation of her experience as one of the few, if not only, women artist/journalists who
found themselves on the frontlines of history tasked with making sense and documenting of what
she bore witness to.
After St. Malo Miller found her way to Paris on the eve of its liberation, where the city
had exploded in liberatory glee after its liberation, she wrote on her arrival; “the long, graceful,

dignified avenues were invaded with flags and filled with screaming, cheering, pretty people.
Girls, bicycles, Kisses and wine and around the corner sniping, a bursting grenade and a burning
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tank’…‘the next day Paris started cleaning up after the world's most gigantic party’”55; these
dramatic oscillations, between the extremes of liberation and the horrors of Nazi crimes, could be
defined as some of Millers most enduring themes to which she would utilize in photographing
the war. After its liberation, Miller made the city a semi-permanent home to which she would
retreat after her many trips across the Western Front. As the war continued Miller, both from
previous friendships as well as on assignment for Vogue, began to seek out and document the her
artist friends from before the war including the painters Pablo Picasso and Christian Bérard, the
designer Elsa Schiaparelli, the poet Jean Cocteau, the novelist Colette, as well as the modernist
fathers of documentary photography Robert Capa and Henri-Cartier Bresson56.
For the remainder of 1944 and into the spring of 1945 Miller was dispatched across the
front writing reports and making images as the allies advanced east. As she stayed longer in the
war, and bore witness to increasingly more horrific atrocities, the wide-eyed Boschian drama of
life and death in the operating room, the possibility of hiding her face from the “Chiaroscuro of
Beige and white” begins to seem an impossibility naive and distant place. The longer she stayed,
it would seem, the more her “reports beg[an] to [increasingly] bear the marks of prolonged
exposure to war. Her characteristic references to painting become fewer and fewer as if the
terrifying proximity to the real was slowly devouring her imaginative capacity”. Writing from
Alsace she makes vividly apparent the effect the war had taken on her; “I'll never see acid-yellow
and gray again like where shells burst near snow without seeing also the pale, quivering faces of
replacements, gray and yellow with apprehension; their fumbling hands and furtive, shortsighted
glances at the field they must cross”57. As Sharon Sliwinski writes; “the ruined landscapes Miller
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encountered could no longer be seen in terms of the acute colors of a Bosch painting. Instead, the
stains of exploded shells, smoke-singed snow, acid yellows, and trails of bright blood tramped
into an icy sheen began filling up her symbolic palette. The strange, dreamlike images that
habitually dot her narratives become increasingly macabre and disjointed…”58. Where Bosch has
left Millers imaginative, so too, it would seem, her conception of the liberating mission as the
holy defense of Europe. Miller begins to refocus the war, critically bearing witness to its violence
and contradictions. Utilizing the evocative propensities of the camera, often by whispering and
gesturing towards work of classical art, she attempts to make sense of the war, rather than simply
document it.
April of 1945, on the brink of the war's end, would bring Miller face to face with the
ultimate machine of the Final Solution first in Buchenwald and lantern in Dachau. Miller arrived
in Buchenwald soon after its liberation on April 11th, where 21,000 prisoners had survived,
among them, the novelist and poet Elie Wiesel. Her images in Buchenwald mark a drastic shift in
Miller's reportage. In bearing witness to the atrocities of Buchenwald any timidness of being
behind the camera, or trepidation in bearing painfully close witness to history, she seems to have
left behind. Any allegiance to the strict formalism of the documentary form was also abandoned.
This is to say, Miller’s images attempted to make sense of the atrocities she bore witness to,
rather than solely document them. In rejecting journalistic objectivity, ethics, and distance she
began to wield the camera as a tool of evocation rather than evidence. Upon entering the camp,
“According to Miller’s son, Anthony Penrose, the photographer's initial reaction to the camp was
one of total disbelief. ‘Speechless and numb, she could not accept at first the enormity of the
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carnage and wanton slaughter.’”59Indexically came to be insufficient a litmus for representation
and meaning in the face of such wanton slaughter.

In

“Released Prisoners in Striped Prison Dress Beside a Heap of Bones from Bodies Burned in the
Crematorium”(Fig 4), five figures stand, headless, side by side forming a line which bisects the
camera's frame. They bear a ghostly, eyeless witness, to a mound of bones before them. The
bright light of a flash sets the whole moment in a brilliantly stark contrast. The caption tells us
59
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these are the bones of people murdered and incinerated in the camps, yet, the lack of the gaze of
the five figures suggests the inability of our wintessing. Indexically the camera could not make
sense, or bear witness, to this scene. In front of the camera, that is, a pile of bones is a pile of
bones, striped pajamas are just bars of black and white. What arises is a tension between the
knowledge that these are the bones of murdered Jewish people, which comes from beyond the
photo, either at the time of its publication or its historical presence, and the lack of any visual
testimony to prove that this is so. The removal of the heads of the five figures where there were
eyes bearing witness, alongside the camera and the spectator, can be read as testifying to the
crises of both bearing witness and visualizing the Holocaust. It is also a paradox of vision, of
witnessing the unimaginable; of bearing witness, to something which can never be understood.
The picture, alone, does not connect the dots of what it shows, that task is relegated to the
captions and context in which it is present, the camera is only responsible for how visions are
made. In conversation, or the
presence of other images, the
picture can explain what has
transpired, however, this was not
what Miller set out to picture in the
camps. Perhaps in an attempt to
make sense, and give a face to
these crimes, Miller photographed
several SS guards still present in
the camp at the time of its
liberation. In “Beaten SS Prison
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Guard” (Fig 5), the bloodied face of an SS guard, who was beaten after attempting to disguise
himself in Civilian clothes, sits dead center in the hard light of a flash. His eyes shining, white
and bulging, distant and trance like. The background is a hazy grey where the only discernible
reality is the shadowy bars of a radiator. His eyes, neither of which directly meet the camera's
gaze, glow as they gaze back out at us. Again the tension in the impossibility of witnessing, on
knowing, is ratcheted up, the camera does not reveal this ghastly figure as anything but a figure
posed before the camera, and yet, it is a horrid gaze for we know what these eyes have borne
witness to, what they have caused.
The connection between this pile of bones, prisoners' feet, beaten guards, and starved
corpses is not one made by either the camera or the captions. Yet, it would be naive to assume
the camera could make those connections alone. As Sliwinski vividly outlines;
Miller’s images and words provide an optic through which to grasp the shock of
confronting the camps. Instead of regarding the work as mere reportage, here the
photographer’s pictures are read as testimony to an encounter with occurrences that
exploded the very grounds of understanding. This is not to suggest Miller provides a
transparent view or totalizing account of what occurred in these Nazi lagers. Rather her
work is read for the ways it is inscribed with all that she did not know of the events to
which she nevertheless bore witness.60
If, as Sliwinski suggests, Miller’s images must be read because of what she did not, could not
know, in the camps, what do we make of the words which accompanied the images, that
attempted to make the images understandable? What do we make of the presence of words and
images which nevertheless attempted o make sense of what had happened before the language
had been created61?
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Dead Prisoners (Fig 6), Miller's first picturing of the bodies of the dead, is a convulsion
of emaciated and starved corpses stacked on top of each other, lit again by a hard flash the whole
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of the scene is cast by the terror of the spectator. We can see many sets of eyes gazing in all
directions, however, only one meets the gaze of the camera. Halfway down the frame on the right
border, two dark, pupil-less eyes gaze back at the camera beneath the foot of a body stacked
above it. Yet, it is not a returned gaze, the picture reminds, everyone here is dead. Death, the
ultimate point of Genocide, has finally, at last, ceased to be a nameless haunt over her images;
from here on out Miller becomes unflinching in her willingness to picture the atrocities to which
she would bear witness. More than any of her other images in Buchenwald this image outlines
the intensity and paradoxical
relationship between photographers
and subjects who were not alive
when their picture was made. The
dead do not speak, this much is
known, but Miller’s image asks that
if we gaze at the dead what do we
make of the gaze they returned? In
the archives the description of
“Dead Prisoners” is blunt in the
extreme; “Every disease imaginable
was rife in the camp, and weakened
by starvation and abuse, the
prisoners died in the thousands”62.Where less than a year earlier Miller accompanied photos of a
field hospital with 10,000 words, here, at the center of the Final Solution, as close as she possibly
could get to history, only 20 words were given. Perhaps this is the effect of long-term and
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repeated exposure to the war where a new distance opens up, an aesthetic and textual
hollow-eyed shell shock, where the burden of her witness becomes immense. Whatever critical
distance the camera afforded her in St. Malo seems to have finally collapsed under the sheer
weight of the responsibility to bear witness. What is left in the rubble, however, is the picture,
and what remains is for spectators to watch and try, for better or for worse, to make sense of the
unimaginable.
Upon leaving Buchenwald, and just
days before arriving in Dachau,
Miller photographed the Deputy
mayor of Leipzig who, along with
his wife, young daughter Regina
Lisso, and his chief of staff, had
committed suicide by cyanide as
allied forces approached the city. In
Miller's contact sheet from that day,
we can see how, like a proper
photojournalist, she makes several
exposures from an informative
distance, but she also made a close-up photograph image of the Mayor's daughter draped across a
dark leather couch. It is an eerily tranquil photo, heavy with allusions to classic figures in art
history, yet, unlike her earlier work Miller does not divulge if “The Deputy Bürgermeister's
daughter [Regina Lisso]” (Fig 7) was a conscious reference to classical art. If, however, Miller
seems to be luxuriating in the sheer beauty of the light, of the connotations of youth and purity,
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of the sheer Manichean contrast which drips from the frame; “Suicided Volkssturm Commander;
Walter Doenicke (outside the window the scales of justice can be seen)” (Fig 8) is an aesthetic
club over the proverbial head that these images are not a place to mourn. A Nazi is dead, and,
quite literally, the scales hang balanced in the hands of justice just outside the windows .
Perhaps in a rejection of the impossibility of her bearing witness, Miller's few images in
Leipzig mark a furthering of the aesthetic shift which she began in Buchenwald. We get a sense
that Miller is trying to wear both the hat of an artist, looking to evoke emotion and meaning, as
well as the journalist trying to document and bear witness. Her images in Leipzig bear the weight
of what could be described as an ethical exhaustion. Miller's images, from here on out, become
increasingly structured, dense with references, and firmly dramatic.
Within days of leaving Leipzig Miller would enter Dachau just one day after its liberation
alongside the Life photographer David E. Scherman and troops from the 43rd Rainbow
Division.63 What she had encountered in her time on the front could not have prepared her for the
atrocities of Dachau. Just two days before her arrival;
The last transport of prisoners arrived at Dachau’s gates. The train was made up of some
thirty-nine boxcars. It extended well past the borders of the camp, in full view of the
city’s suburban villas ringing the camp’s perimeter. The train’s cargo consisted of
approximately three thousand prisoners whom the Nazis had evacuated from Buchenwald
on or about April 7. As allied troops approached the camp on the afternoon of April 29,
the train was their first discovery. When they opened the ‘quarantined’ boxcars, corpses
tumbled out onto the gravel below. Each car was filled with bodies impossibly tangled in
rage, blood, and excrement. Of thousands packed onto the train, fewer than twenty still
drew breath. There were signs of cannibalism. Beyond the horrific scenes of death and
decay, the terrible, cloying stench is often what remains uppermost in the memories of
those who took part in the liberation.64
Unlike in Buchenwald, the camera was mobilized, intentionally and instrumentally, to attempt to
make sense of the Nazi atrocities. For days after the camp's liberation, on April 29th, allied
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forces were ordered to leave the remnants of the camps untouched so they could be viewed and
documented by G.I.s, journalists, and photographers. Countless photographers-both allied G.I.s
posing for grotesque snapshots as well as professional journalists-made images of the camp in
the days following the liberation of the camp. Hundreds, if not thousands, of photographs,
prospered in those days and the camera became entrusted as the sole carrier of things to which
there were not yet words, I do not mean this pedantically, quite literally the word to describe
what occurred had not been invented; Raphael Lemkin was actively penning his “Axis Rule in
Occupied Europe” which would create the word genocide, while the Holocaust as a name for
mass German eradication of European Jewry would not come into common discourse until well
after the end of the War in the 1960s, and it was not until the 1948 United Nations Genocide
Conference that an international definition would be agreed upon65. Even if there had been
words, they may not have been enough, the pictures certainty were not. Miller's initial reaction,
on seeing the train “was one of total disbelief...Speechless and numb, she could not accept at first
the enormity of the carnage and wanton slaughter”6667. Even battle-hardened Soldiers broke down
in tears or began vomiting uncontrollably, believing at first, that “the camp was a grotesque
propaganda stunt faked by their side”68. The liberator's physical, and uncontrollable, reactions to
that train makes vividly clear that “the direct sight of human subjects stripped of their
humanity-people treated as mere matter, things that had neither body nor soul-was, not
something that could be held in mind, nor indeed, digested"69.
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Likely one of the first images she made upon entering the camp was of the body of an SS
guard floating partially submerged in the Camps's canal. Again, like in Leipzig, Miller seems
incapable of not giving in to the immense thematic contrast Dead SS Prison Guard Floating in
Canal, 30th April 1945” (Fig 9) is laden with. The body lies suspended in space as it floats in the
canal and in time by the
camera's lens. Eyes closed,
the figure seems at peace,
which is given an eerie
presence by the knowledge
that the corpse is of a dead
SS guard who oversaw the
longest running
concentration camp of the
war. In a troublesome echo,
the placid face of the dead
soldier evokes Millais’
Ophelia70; floating,
wistfully, with flowers in her hair down the stream. At once redemptive and justified his partial
submergence in the shimmering water gestures towards Miller’s struggles with the question of
“responsibility, memory, and grief.”71 However, a corpse does not float forever, eventually, his
body, his crimes, unless disturbed, will sink beneath the muck of history. Yet, Miller neither
allows meaning to rise from the murky water nor, for the tension of these contradictions to float
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away. Only the soldier's dark-sleeved arm rises above the
surface of the water, a breach between the murky depths
of history and the bright reality of the cameras present.
Miller remains in this breach, violating the boundaries
between journalist and artist, oscillating between the
unknowability of the Shoah and her active bearing
witness as she moves farther into the camp.
In Millers contact sheet “Box cars with dead prisoners
and US soldiers examine a truck load of dead prisoners”
(fig 10) we see her framing, setting the scene so to speak,
as two G.I.s approach alongside a row of train cars (fig
11), every car they pass the doors are shut tight, the
camera turns (fig 12) and reveals the corpses tumbling
out from the deep shadows. In (fig 13) the two soldiers
replicate the gaze of the camera and accompany gaze
into the murky shadows of the train car, and finally,
perhaps finding these other views not compelling
enough, (fig 14) Miller steps beyond the boundary and
enters the train car. A severe violation of the expected
boundaries of the witness and spectator was passed
through when Miller entered that car, and yet, what
distinguishes that view, what makes it so unnerving, is
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not easy to describe or distinguish. Something is revealed and surpassed which she stepped into
that train car, and yet;
It is difficult to describe precisely what this image brings into view, the nature of what it
transmits to the spectator. If Dachau were only a play, a grotesque propaganda stunt as
the liberators first imagined, one might say this photograph breaks the ‘fourth wall’. It
takes us behind the scenes to show us the scaffolding of the stage. But of course, this is
no play. Miller crosses what seems like an impossible boundary, entering into monstrous,
unimaginable space, this gruesome community of the dead. As spectators of this image
we, too, are imaginatively brought into this railcar-cum-coffin. From inside the train, we
observe the living peering across this last frontier without recognition. Miller’s pictures
show what language can never say. It is a devastating revelation of that which can never
be put into words. The photographer's fragile arrangement of figures in space simply
imposes itself on us. It offers to our gaze an opening toward the inside and the depths of
the invisible, arousing our own fascination and anxiety about what we cannot and do not
want to know about death, and especially this death, this brutal extinction which one
hesitates to even call death.72
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These pictures “testify to events at the heart of civilization’s discontents and stubbornly remain at
the limits of human understanding”73. They resist our desires to witness them, they remain
unknowable, and perhaps as “another sign of the paradoxes of traumatic sight: there are
thousands of photographs of the Dachau train, but all are taken from outside of its borders. With
the exception of Miller’s single image, the view from inside this world remains out of sight, and
indeed, beyond the scope of understanding”74.
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Perhaps as a sign of the severity of Miller's breaching of this barrier between life and
death, this picture was not published in Vogue that spring. In a world already rife with images of
horror this view, joining with the community of the dead, proved beyond the limits of the
allowed imagination, it was made unbearable to witness. Was the reason Audrey Withers,
Vogue's formidable editor during WWII, did not publish this image in Vogue that spring75
because she was concerned with an ethic in line with the filmmaker Claude Lanzmann’s critical
position where these pictures can only ever function as a “veil and shield, inciting a false sense
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of knowledge all the while protecting the spectator form the true horror”76? Or, was she
concerned of the effect that remaining “with this photograph for any length of time is to risk [sic]
experiencing a tear in one’s imaginative capacity” would have on the viewers back home?77
Witnessing horror, in the printing room, has, it would seem, limits. Yet, why is it that to bear
witness from the space of the dead proved to push past the limit of journalistic integrity in a
moment flushed with images of atrocity?
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While this vision was kept from the public eyes the war drew to a close, the testimony of
survivors began to circulate, and at times, surpass the modus operandi which was unique to the
act of bearing witness in camera. For contemporary witnesses, it can be taken for granted all that
we do know about these atrocities. Most of the understanding of the Final solution only happened
long after the camps were liberated and the cameras stowed away. The camera, we must
remember, was primarily mobilized to make visual sense of the camps and to reproduce in the
printing press, revised on editors' guests, and witnessed by public eyes. What is at stake then;
in attending the testimony these images offer is not, of course, merely an issue of
verifying the material form of a past reality. The copious photographs of the same
crumpled corpse should not simply lead us to question how images can supplement the
historical evidence offered by other kinds of documents’...‘An interpretation of the
testimony of the image must do more than aim to accurately describe social reality or a
collective sensibility of a past period. Indeed, like its verbal counterpart, visual testimony
is less about verifying material evidence than about registering the impact of
experience.78
This is to say that the very act of witnessing was pushed, and exceeded, by the vision of
the camera in the camps. As Primo Levi famously outlined “we the survivors are not the true
witnesses. The true witnesses, those in possession of the unspeakable truth are the drowned, the
dead, the disappeared”; the only gaze the dead can return is one of absolute, totalizing, silence.
This critical position, as Sliwinski outlines, is perhaps best summarised by the position of the
Filmmaker Claude Lanzmannv “for whom there can be no understanding of the Final Solution.
In his view, striving toward intelligibility-the very project of understanding-itself constitutes an
obscenity. In his nine and a half hour film, Shoah, Lanzmann famously refused to include any
historical photographs, which, he argues, is the only responsible way to represent what is, in fact,
unimaginable”79. Miller's work in Dachau is underlined, perhaps even defined, by both the
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unknowability contained by that silence, the experience of dying in the camps, in addition to all
she could not know. The atrocity to which Millers pictures attested in Buchenwald, and later in
Dachau, was so unimaginable in the minds of those who bore witness that they did not produce a
better sense of understanding of what had happened, in direct opposition to the long-held notion
of photographies indexical truth, these pictures, alone, couldn’t tell what happened, but “rather
[they] open[ed] a kind of ethical abyss”. The visions that the twin-lenses of her Rolleiflex
produced attested to were “occurrences that could not be understood at the time of their
unfolding, occurrences for which there were not yet words”80.That is to say, the camera could not
make sense of what had happened; because neither the language to describe it, genocide, the
crime which had committed, a crime against humanity, nor the testimonies of witnesses, of the
survivors, yet existed. Witnesses could not know to what the camera had bore witness, modern
spectators still can not know
It is no coincidence then that the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
was immediately preceded by the circulation of these images, in fact, “the preamble of the
[Universal Declaration of Human Rights] quietly refers to this pictorial revelation of the camps’
operations as those ‘barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind’”81. These
images attest to events for which the declarations and constitutions of Western democracies not
only had not imagined, but proved completely incapable, or perhaps unwilling, to defend. As
such, the drafters of the UDHR set out to construct a wholly new form of rights that could
explain, and defend, the rights which had been violated in the camps. Human Rights were
created as a direct reaction to the witnessing of this new unnamable, unbearable, horror, which
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pushed the limits ontological limits of the capacity of the Human and necessitated new
languages, politics, and rights to make sense of and defend82.

Looking to the East.
On the other side of Europe, as the war was drawing to a close, the Soviet army was
producing highly forensic photographic documents of Nazi atrocities in the East. Where the Nazi
atrocities on the Western Front were defined by the camps, buildings, cities, and railroad cars the
East had pits, canyons, forests, and mineshafts where the atrocities were carried out. As David
Shneer outlines;
The majority of photographs testifying to Nazi crimes on the eastern front were taken by
photographers working for the Soviet Extraordinary Commissions, a body established in
November 1942 to investigate crimes that took place in every city that the Red Army
liberated’...The Extraordinary Commission teams were made up of military leaders,
forensic experts, doctors, journalists, photographers, and interviewers who gathered
testimony of survivors. After the team conducted its research it often wrote a report
stating its findings and generally included photographs taken at the investigation site.
This kind of forensic photography emerged as a powerful means of visualizing Nazi
atrocities and served as some of the earliest Holocaust liberation photography anywhere
in the world.83
Rather than following the modernist tradition of documentary photographs, intended for
the printing presses, Soviet images have a closer resemblance to the factual, flatly lit, and highly
evidentiary images of crime scene photographs. In part, it is their forensic construction that adds
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to why they feel less emotionally evocative than iconographic images of western liberation.
Soviet photographers were less interested in picturing those who had survived, because the
purpose of these images was to produce forensic evidence against Nazi war crimes. As such “In
very few Soviet liberation photographs do we ever see close-ups of living human faces. One is
more likely to see a close-up of the dead than of the living”; however, this did not inhibit these
locations, crimes, and images from becoming any less synonymous with Nazi crimes than the
camps have in the west. The ‘iconography’ of a photo is not, counterintuitively, a product solely
of the camera's vision; “a photograph of exhumed corpses without context only reveals corpses,
not how they got there. We need the all-powerful caption writer to present the interpretive frame
for genocide. The caption gives the photograph meaning”84. The captions are as much what
raises an image to an iconographic status as the visual object of the photograph alone.
Babi Yar, was “a pit among other pits throughout the Ukrainian countryside, but one that
held the remains of more than 100,000 people” and, given its magnitude, quickly became as
ubiquitous to the East as the gates of Auschwitz were to the west;
The name of Kiev’s Babi Yar became infamous throughout the Soviet Union, and much
later worldwide, as the icon of the Nazi genocide against Jews and others in the Soviet
Union. And like Auschwitz, Babi Yar overshadows the fact that every town, especially
in Ukraine, had its ravine (Yar), pit (Yama), or trench (Rov) on its outskirts, to which
the Nazis took local Jews to murder them.1 If in English, in relation to World War II,
the word ‘‘camp’’ has become overdetermined, the Russian word yar came to stand
for Nazi atrocities, so much so that poets used it to evoke a whole series of associations
for the reader. As the Soviet (and Jewish) writer Ilya Ehrenburg poetically wrote about
the scarred Soviet landscape, ‘I used to live in cities, / And happily lived among the
living, / Now on empty vacant lands / I must dig up the graves. / Now every ravine
is a sign / And every ravine is now my home. 85
The series of images that the Extraordinary Commission produced of Babi Yar attests to the
formal process these sites underwent in order to represent the Holocaust in the east. After the
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victory at Stalingrad in February of 1943, the Soviet army pushed consistently west until the fall
of the Reich in 1945. Kiev, which was in the direct path to Berlin, was liberated in November of
1943. The city had been leveled under Nazi occupation and the Soviet newspapers “covered the
liberation of Kiev with great triumph but also with utter disgust as writers and photographers
bore witness to Nazi atrocities”86. It was in the outskirts of Kiev that the mass grave at Babi yar
was uncovered. While this would not have been the first mass graves the Soviets had unearthed
on the Eastern front, nothing they had encountered could scale in the light of what had taken
place at Babi Yar.

The nine photos of Babi Yar (this paper will only cite six of them) - archived in the
Ukrainian State Photo, Film, and Sound Archives and presented for the first time in Shneers
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article - begin where the photographers, most likely coming from Kiev, first caught a glimpse of
the canyon below. The first image, “General View of the Execution Site at Babi Yar,’’(Fig 1),
looks down a steep canyon onto a light, sandy, or perhaps ashy floor. Not much can be discerned
of what has occurred from up here, but this was likely not the first of these mass graves the
photographer had come across. As such the photographer “He (rarely she) would already know
how the scene would unfold, but like a good forensic photographer, he began at the
beginning—with a “‘general view [obshchii vid]’’’ of the crime scene87. The Caption is stark and
simple, only providing a wide and general explanation of the valley below, it reads; “‘General
View of the Execution Site at Babi Yar’’.
In Figures two and three, which are nearly indistinguishable from each other, the
photographer has begun to descend into the canyon. The camera looks straight ahead towards a
steep cliffside which juts up from the canyon floor. Barren and pale, the landscape is not only
devoid of life but seems antagonistic to its very existence. The small brush that can be seen is
brambly and mostly withered. While the camera suggests we are looking at the same scene from
different angles, however, “The archival notations on the verso’...‘tell us (correctly or not) that
these two identical images are radically different crime scenes”88. The caption to figure 2 reads,
“View of the Execution Site of Soviet Citizens at Babi Yar in 1941 (Kiev, 1944)”. In only a few
words the caption writer has re-wrote how we see an empty canyon. It is no longer empty, but
rather, a site where an act of emptying has occurred. While the caption writer knows only what
she (not likely he) knows from official reports, and local tel-tale, she identifies them first, and
only, as soviet citizens.89 There is an intense nationalism that is served in the captioning of all the
Babi Yar photos, which informs who the crime was committed against, Soviet citizens on their
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territory, and who perpetrated it, National Socialists. While the photograph, alone, does not
provide easily legible iconography and signifiers, the captions assure we know what we are
seeing. What neither the image nor the captions tell us, however, is that the people murdered here
were Soviet Jewish citizens. If that distinction mattered to the captioners it can not be assured by
the information provided by the images and their captions90. Absent, of course, both in the

captions, the picture, and its history are the names, faces, and voices of those who fell. Yet, the
camera does not resolve in a dead-end, but in a space where we are invited, for better or for
worse, to comprehend what has occurred here; “to close our eyes and picture crowds of Jewish
men, women, and children lined up at the top of the empty ravine, perched at the precipice,
crying, screaming, wailing as the sound of shots rings out in the picture. Body after body falls
90
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into the pit as the mound of the dead piles up in the foreground. But just as quickly, we open our
eyes and see what the camera captured—emptiness.”91 Emptiness is not always silence, and the
absent are not always relegated, only, to a fixed and mute past.
Yet, Fig 2. Only attested to half of the crime committed at Babi Yar. The next landscape,
“Territory at Babi Yar Where the Corpses of Soviet Citizens Shot by the Germans Were
Incinerated in 1941 (Kiev, 1943–1944)”92 (fig 3), also deep in the canyon, tells us what happened
after the bodies fell. It reads. Light sand, grey gravel, the sediment of the canyon is now revealed
to be the ashes of the Soviet Jews who were murdered here. This image, while most likely of the
same area, now asks us “to conjure a different moment in the crime, from the murder to its
cover-up as the German occupation authorities attempted to destroy evidence of genocide”93.
Once again the camera here registers the emptiness of a grave.

91
92
93

Shneer, “Ghostly Landscapes: Soviet Liberators Photograph the Holocaust,” 240.
Ibid, 240.
Ibid, 240.

Dilley 65

Yet, the emptiness is not only the absence of life, in the way a grave marks the site and
contains the body of the dead, but rather, the absence even of the bodies of the dead. The caption
attests to the fact that mass extermination was not the ultimate goal of the Holocaust, but rather,
the complete eradication in the present, future, and past of Jewish, Queer, Disabled, and
Communist lives and Bodies94. As Nicholas Mirzoeff outlines, the eradication of Jewish visual
representation, histories, and cultural practice was just as central to the Final Solution as mass
murder. The camera, then, in the Nazi crimes became symbolic of the failure of their project as it
could hold the bodies, faces, and lives of those the Reich murdered long after their deaths. As
such;
The Nazis made every effort to keep their crimes secret and invisible, referring to those
killed as figuren, puppets or drawings, rather than as people. In choosing this metaphor,
Nazi ideology evinced a contempt for visual representation as being a subordinate or
inferior form of cultural practice. The Jewish/queer/disabled or Communist body was an
inferior copy of the perfect Aryan and consequently did not even deserve to exist. During
the Shoah, bodies were turned to ash, which was itself dispersed.95
The camera, in
‘‘Overview of the
Execution Site at Babi
Yar in 1941”(Fig 4),
draws out from the
canyon and once again
provides a wide
landscape shot of the
site. After the intensity
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of the last two images this scene, despite it being of the same location with a similar caption,
providing a brief space of respite where the photographer foregrounds “life this time, albeit in the
form of brush, which obscures the desolation of the ravine itself”96. Having set the scene in
perspective, scale, content, and context the photographer draws in close as the camera becomes
further utilized as a forensic tool in ‘‘Remains of Ashes in Babi Yar, In Which the Corpses of
Those Executed Were Incinerated (Kiev, 1943–1944)”97(Fig 5).

Even this close to the crime, the camera fails to register anything but rocks, sand, and it is only
from the forensic process, which came after the camera and informed the captioner, that we can
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begin to see ash. We have zoomed in, so to speak, on the grey sandy bottom from which we had
only been allowed to see from a distance.

While the photograph does not make it explicitly clear both its caption and its position
alongside the other images in the series, make it vividly clear that we have descended into a mass
grave.It is not until the last two photographs from Babi Yar,“‘Exhumations of Graves in Babi Yar,
Where Soviet Citizens Were Executed (Kiev, 1944)’’(fig 6 and 7), that the presence of both the
living and the dead, enter the frame;
The final two photographs take us further along in the forensic process as living people
emerge. At last, the ghosts come out of the ground, the truth is revealed. The German
attempt to hide the crime has failed as exhumations reveal a long, grim trench filled with
bodies. If the photographer had backed up to give us another ‘‘general view,’’ we would
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see this exhumation at the bottom of that first trench as we come full circle in unmasking
genocide.”98
Figure six unearths the long, narrow, mass grave which sat buried at the bottom of the canyon we
had already seen from a distance. Wavering over the scene the camera depicts not “the
exhumation itself, but to the Extraordinary Commission team bearing witness to the now
revealed crime scene”99.We bear witness not only to the atrocity of the mass grave but also, to the
gaze of the Soviets looking down into the full extent of the crime; into the unknown and
unbelievable.
A consistent presence, once the dead become present, is that of the witnessing scientists,
researchers, military officers, and other societies whose gaze into the pits. Once the bodies of
Babi Yar are exhumed the presence of Soviet “researchers posing over the bodies’ seems to be
‘proof that the crimes we viewers bear witness to are German, not Soviet, crimes, or at least that
is what we are supposed to think”100. Like forensic researchers who study murder scenes day in
and day out, these photographers too captioned their photographs in a hauntingly dry, descriptive
manner”101; in a strange inversion of Sontag’s warning that “a saturation point” may be reached
by “everyone [gaining] a certain familiarity with atrocity [in pictures], making the horrible seem
more ordinary”102, it was not the camera which brought about a deadening of the senses, but
rather, the repeated exposure to the reality of the Final Solution.
There are two distances at play here. There is, of course, the distance mandated by the
camera. Which is mediated and filtered through, in this order, the photographer's judgment, the
physical body of the camera, its lens, shutter, and film, and finally its dissemination be it
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journalistic, propagandistic, or democratic. Then there is the distance which comes with the job,
so to speak. The images of the Committee must primarily be understood not as documentary, at
least not in the modernist connotations of intent and evocation, but rather, in the language of
forensic and criminal photographs.

These photos of atrocity were intended as part of a wider project of forensic investigation
where the final destination of the photograph is not in the press, to evoke emotion, nor the
history books, to remember the crimes, but rather, the courts. Not to say these weren’t both at
play in the commission's images and dissemination, they assuredly were, rather the main goal of
the pictures then should be understood as objects which assisted in the uncovering and
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documentation of Nazi crimes as well as the production of evidence which would later be used as
“evidence in war crimes trials, including the earliest ones at Krasnodar, in southern Russia, in
1943”103. As part of the forensic process, the camera becomes engaged in the transformation of
not only the physical landscape of eastern Europe into evidence of Nazi Atrocities but also, “into
the medium in which different types of evidence come together and into relation with each
other.”104 The point of these images is not that they prove the Soviets liberated Kiev. The point of
the images, at the time of their creation, was that they showed, indexically, a crime. They leave
the scene ‘untouched’ for the forensic teams to make sense of what happened;
The empty ravine photographs leave everything to the imagination. The goal of
such photographs was to document a crime scene, and in crime scene photography a
photographer invites the viewer to conjure what was once in the scene. It is a moment
when the camera fails as a tool of documentation. Its indexicality becomes an invitation
for imagination, not the final word of evidence.105
In reading the picture, alone, one would not know that these are the bodies of Ukrainian
Jews who were murdered by the National Socialists and whose bodies are now being exhumed
by the advancing Soviet armies. For the forensic scientists, however, what mattered in the image
was precisely how the indexical quality of the camera only rendered, and did not attempt to make
sense of, a canyon filled with sand, rocks, and brambles. What transpired, how many died, and
how they were killed was not expected to be the task of the camera, “that is [sic] for the forensic
scientists, researchers, and of course the ubiquitous representatives of the National Commissariat
of Internal Affairs, the notorious NKVD, to determine through interviews (or interrogations) of
local townspeople, who may have borne witness to (or participated in) the crime”106. It can be
easy to confuse the coldness of Forensic’s analytical language of visuals, especially in contrast to
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the drama of liberation seen in Miller's images, for lacking in a compassionate or ethical enough
gaze, however, a rigidity of form or strictness of intent should not be confused with an
uncompassionate gaze. As Shneer attests to, in focusing on the sight of Nazi atrocities as crime
scenes, and thus producing crime scene photographs, the Soviet photographers could better grasp
the impossibility of their witness than the liberatoy visions of Allied photographers;
In very few Soviet liberation photographs do we ever see close-ups of living human
faces. One is more likely to see a close-up of the dead than of the living. This makes
Soviet liberation photography more reflective of the experience of genocide than the
human drama of survival captured in American and British photography. Ultimately,
there is an epistemological problem with understanding genocide through the images and
voices of the survivors. If genocide is defined by the mass murder of a group of people,
then those who survive genocide have a minority experience. The vast majority of those
who experience a genocide—whether it be the Holocaust, Rwanda, or Cambodia—die.
That is the point of genocide. And yet the dead cannot bear witness to their own
experience of death. In these mundane, haunting, and sublime images, Soviet
photographers have unwittingly captured that which tells the story of genocide—ghostly
landscapes haunted by the dead, not by the living.107
The camera, in the East, was primarily engaged with producing evidence, rather than the
production of emotive images of the visual horror of Human suffering, of people stripped to the
bareness of their humanness, as seen in the liberation of the Western camps. American Liberation
photos, before being considered as evidence, were primarily intended as propaganda images to
support the heroism of the American forces and distributed in the pages of Life and Vogue.
While soviet journalists, photographers, and the Extraordinary Commission researchers widely
distributed the news and photographs of Nazi Atrocities in newspapers such as the leading
wartime newspaper Red Star, the 500-page project documenting the Nazi murder of Soviet Jews
the Black Book, and the Illustrated Newspaper which published the works of photojournalist
Arkady Shaykhet108; ultimately the reason the Eastern sites of extermination were so widely
photographed was for evidence, not evocation. A distinction that should not be overlooked.
107
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After
Its blazingly ironic how much these two distinct bodies of photographs come to resemble
the stereotypes of anti-communist American politics which emerged during the Red Scare; where
the western democracies represent the golden honorific godly light of glory in human heroism,
individualism, and goodness from laissez-faire capitalism; and life behind the iron curtain of
Soviet communism is a bleak, non-individualistic, tundra where the expression of human
emotion more closely resembles the function of a factory than the empathy of spirit. This is why
we must pay special attention to the reception, reaction, and politics that emerged from the
spectator's engagement with the images in the Capitalist West and Soviet east, respectively. If we
are to take Sliwinski analysis seriously, in “rewriting the history of human rights as born, in part,
from spectators’ aesthetic response” 109 to the photographs of the Holocaust, we must also contest
with the fact that Human Rights did not emerge from the images of the east but the iconographic
drama of liberation as seen through the eyes of Lee Miller. Human Rights emerged, then, under a
false witness to crimes which could not be understood in pictures.
What these photographs from the eastern front, of the canyons and landscapes, outline is
how the photos of the liberation of the Western Front constructed the violence perpetrated there
as the whole machine of the Final Solution. When, in reality, atrocities took place as much in the
camps liberated by the allies in the west as the canyons and streets of the Eastern bloc. The
camps, by way of the camera, became seared into the minds of the west as the sole form of the
Holocaust. In many ways the camps represent the central industrialized machine to the Nazi’s
genocidal project, however: “the problem with Auschwitz as a metonym of genocide is that it
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conceals as much as it reveals. Genocide takes place less often in purpose-built death centers
than in mundane sites of daily existence, like ‘‘killing fields’’ in Cambodia or by the sides of
roads in Rwanda. So too with the Holocaust. In the Soviet Union, the Holocaust was more
mundane, by which I mean it was more integrated into daily life under Nazi occupation”110.
Places where vast and horrific violence occurred, where a camera was not present, become then,
in contrast, only fables of atrocity in comparison to the industrial machine of genocide in
Auschwitz. The camera's vision is better engaged with visualizing the events as the exception
rather than the rule. This blind spot of the camera, in its lacking ability to depict
non-iconographic violence, proves to be a major flaw in attempting to understand a genocide
where, as Hannah Arendt precisely named, violence was more often banal than exceptional.
Two distinct forms of the Final Solution, each requiring distinct fields of vision and
unique discursive forms. Miller's images of the camps come no closer to bearing true witness
than the Commission's forensic images of the eastern landscapes. However, as Shneer writes on
the latter; “in these mundane, haunting, and sublime images, Soviet photographers have
unwittingly captured that which tells the story of genocide—ghostly landscapes haunted by the
dead, not by the living”111. Both sets of images are engaged in a visual mythologizing of the
Holocaust, iconographic cataloging of the unimaginable, where the joining of words and images,
either forensically or evocatively, attempted to make sense of the unimaginable.
Yet, it was not the photos of Babi Yar and the landscapes of the East which shadowed the drafters
as they penned these words in the preamble of the UDHR; “Whereas disregard and contempt for
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind,
and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy the freedom of speech and belief
110
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and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common
people...Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest
importance for the full realization of this pledge”. Implied in the preamble is a commonality of
shared humanity to which no one can be denied of these rights, “But all these fragile
testimonies’...‘attest such rights cannot be claimed as natural, inalienable endowments of the
species”112. If pre-determinant to Human Rights ever being recognized in full, is a shared
common understanding of these rights, what would it mean to then take seriously the fact that it
was in the minds of spectators bearing witness to something for which there could be no
commonality of understanding that Human Rights emerged? That is to say, Human Rights are, at
their core, acts of judgment and witnessing. What then do we make of the contradictions inherent
to the shaky representational grounds from which Human Rights emerged? To bear witness to
the unwitnessable is the foundational paradox of Human Rights. For better or worse, it was from
this fraught and contested space of the spectator's judgment held in representations of
unknowable atrocities, from which universal rights emerged. They were born from contradictions
to which images do not show us the answers, and too, they remain in contradiction. In reading a
pictorial trail of rights emergence, frustratingly, the camera, indexically and evocatively, proves
utterly incapable of stopping violence, only making it real for those who were not there. Perhaps
this is too bold an assumption to ever have been thrust upon it, nevertheless, this is the position
which photography has been given;
Ultimately, there is an epistemological problem with understanding genocide through the
images and voices of the survivors. If genocide is defined by the mass murder of a group
of people, then those who survive genocide have a minority experience. The vast
majority of those who experience a genocide—whether it be the Holocaust, Rwanda, or
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Cambodia—die. That is the point of genocide. And yet the dead cannot bear witness to
their own experience of death.113
Human Rights, then, in being conjured only in the judgment of spectators, fraught and
impossible as that space may be, are “concepts and realities that areaways, in some sense, to
come”114. If the dead could speak, if their shadowy eyes could only return our gaze, perhaps it
would not be so impossible to understand these atrocities, yet, they can not speak and they do not
return our gaze. Human Rights then must be defined as arising from a place of impossibility,
spectators did not know what they bore witness to in the camps, contemporary witnesses still do
not know, nevertheless, they bore witness to the pictures and from that witness, Human Rights
emerged.
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During the Vietnam War, which lasted longer than any war we've ever been in - and
which we lost - every respectable artist in this country was against the war. It was like a
laser beam. We were all aimed in the same direction. The power of this weapon turns
out to be that of a custard pie dropped from a stepladder six feet high.

~Kurt Vonnegut

Chapter 3
Inverted Visions
To speak of war today and its many discontents, violence, genocide, hunger,
displacement, refugees, as well as its haunts, trauma, survival, and environmental degradation-is
to speak with and through images. The dominance of images over the battlefield can be attested
to the rise of Human Rights as the primary vernacular by which peace is defended. Since the
ratification of the UDHR in 1948, and especially since the end of the cold war, the defense of
Human Rights has been used as intended by anti-war defenders in addition to global
governments utilizing defense of rights as a guise through which to continue military and
colonial expansion. Regardless of how the language of universal rights has been utilized it is
always accompanied, furnished, and legitimized by photographs, specifically, the image of
atrocity. Much has been spoken about the violence of the image, of its tendency to often
reproduce and disseminate, without a critical eye, images of war, death, and atrocity. The makers
of these images often defend their work as being a necessary bearing of witness to a constructed
responsibility to history, fellow humanity, or country. Perhaps, they might say, these images are
self-evident, and the violence they depict is so horrific that its very presence, in images, is
enough to drive spectators to immediately act and make political claims against violence. Or
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they conceptualize a certain responsibility to history, fellow humanity, or country to bear witness
and document violent atrocities.
Commonly this is a notion well circulated in discussions of representative ethics,
journalism, and art, which attempts to address questions of what direct and measurable impact art
can have on political life. Much of this discourse abounded during the first fully-fledged war that
was both highly photographed as well as transported directly to the television sets of suburban
America, the Vietnam war. It was expected that one image would have more of an effect on the
public to bring about the cessation of the conflict than the whole of the Anti-War movement
combined. Embedded in this desire is an assumption that “simply seeing the suffering and
violence of war some-how make possible the thought of its prevention”.115 This mode of
photography is engaged in a search for a perfect instant, a pure object of vision, which can in
theory communicate the importance of the conflict as a stand-alone image; privileging the
singular image over the series of images, images in context, or images in pairing with words. Not
to say that art has no influence, but rather, that images alone can not stem the tides of military
might and we should be wary of any snake-oil salesman who tries to convince otherwise. Images
alone, as an act of resistance, fall short of achieving a political or social victory. It only when
contextualized, or placed in ecologies of solidarity, power can emerge from actions and art. The
engagement of photography during the Vietnam war was certainly a historical turning point in
the usage of photography. For the first time, the vast physical distances between the military
front and civilian life were able to be lessened by the presence of embedded photographers as
well as news cameras. This kind of image, however, is inseparable from the medium of its
production and dissemination as directly overseen, allowed, and filtered by armies, large media
corporations, and state censorship. Images of war that appear alone, decontextualized, and
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separated from larger patterns of images or textual support are made as such to be well oiled to
smoothly traverse media infrastructures from the battlefield to television; to be functional,
meaningless.
This trafficking of images has often fallen under sharp criticism from scholars, activists,
and artists who critique these images-which have been coined as ‘images of atrocity’-as
mobilizing images of violence in a form that produces atrocity as consumable rather than critical.
Perhaps most famously, Susan Sontag claimed that the reproduction of the image of atrocity is
often guilty of engaging in a pornographic rather than photographic act. Where the viewer is
immobilized as a voyeur rather than a spectator with political and social responsibility to act on
the horrors contained by the image's border116. While Sontag would later revise, and to some
extent, attempt to retract her earlier vindication against photography in Regarding the Pain of
Others, it is her first argument that still haunts photography today. I do not mean to attempt
moralizing the image, it is too ubiquitous and unyielding to ever be pinned down as having an
inherent morality. Rather, the argument I will attempt to make, that photography and human
Rights are ubiquitous because Human Rights are inherently photographic, relies on an
understanding of photography as being incapable of inherent meaning.
So while the image can be violent, and often is utilized as such, as I will argue, this
capability of the image to do harm and reproduce violence has less to do with the nature of the
image, or the inherent vice of silver halides and pixels, and more to do with the uneven plains of
power upon which images are made, reproduced, interpreted, contextualized, and disseminated.
What is often at stake is less the truth a photographic image may attest to, but rather, the political
or social implications implicit to a photographer. In other words, the meaning of images is what
is up for grabs in these debates. It is necessary, however, to recognize the extent to which
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photographies repressive function has, in recent decades, grown in usage and presence
throughout state rule; most severely in the surveillance of hyper militarized border zones, as the
mechanism which allows bombs to be dropped by unmanned drones piloted from across the
globe, in the embedded military photographers who produce state-sanctioned propaganda, and
from satellite imaging which provides visual evidence of geographies and infrastructures which
legitimize military interventions in the defense of rights.

In Sontag's Shadow
In looking at the reception of images today, and the scandals which abound when one is
proven to be faked, it seems we trust images to tell us what happened. While words, and stories,
even when they are spoken by survivors, have become untrustworthy against the stark reality
images produce and the events to which they testify. As such, photographs have propagated
across law, insurance, governance, policing, science, bureaucracy, family histories, archives,
medical practice, and the academy as the ultimate and final representative evidence of the world.
The rise of a world contained, and defined, by images implies the rise of someone, of a specific
community, who would gaze, ponder, judge, and hopefully act upon the images imperative; this
is the community of the spectator. Much has been spoken about the violence of these images and
the often apathetic, inactive, responses of the communities who view them. Perhaps most
famously, as articulated by Susan Sontag, photographs have a tendency to be consumed and
produced in a way that is more in line with the pornographic image than that of the evidentiary,
revolutionary, or moving.
There is a long history of critics of photography painting the community of spectators as
blinded by an overwhelming stimulus of images, that there are too many photographs in the
world; “they would rather avoid looking; they are wary of horrific [intolerable] images, they
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need more stimulation sights and more powerful images to move them”117. Or that the “The vast
photographic catalogs of misery and injustice throughout the world has given everyone a certain
familiarity with atrocity, making the horrible seem more ordinary-making it appear familiar,
remote (‘it’s only a photograph’), inevitable”118. Through this criticism images are imagined as
deriving their value [meaning] in much the same way as a currency of exchange in current
capitalist economies, that is, their value is in constant flux and the ‘price’ of their meaning is in a
constant upward trajectory where each image must replicate, and intensify, the emotionality of
the last to extract the same product; action. In this conception, images are placed in the same
currents of capital as shipping, industry, and global trade.
To ‘traffic’ in images, then, means to attempt fixing the power of the image to repeatedly
extract ‘emotional value’ and to spur spectators to action. In other words, if images are
‘trafficked’ through capitalism in the same way as capital then we must understand its dominant
mode is the production of action through the commodity language of advertising119. Images that
attempt to produce emotional responses from events that have a deficit social capital value rather
than creating emotionality respond in the same way as economic currency; deflation. We see
more yet feel less. From this position it has been extrapolated that the empathy response of the
spectator has also gone through a process of inflation; images that move communities to
revolution, protest, and action must be constantly upping the ante from the movements before
them.
On the opposite side of this historical debate is a desire for a ‘pure object of vision’
which also implies the presence of a “pure spectator who will encounter the image, be appalled
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by what is revealed, and successfully change the world through her active response to it”120. Yet
despite repeated failures of such a spectator to arise the desire for one to exist has not
considerably waned. This dream for such a character is a faulty and unattainable desire in its
lacking to take seriously several key considerations; first and foremost the lack of a field in
which such a vision could be possible let alone the fact that there is no such image in
existence121; secondly, it ignores the historic reactions to images of atrocity which has more
commonly not been immediate action but the closing of eyes and the evasion of gazes122 ; and
lastly, this formulation conveniently separates photography “as a tool for seeing the world, for
recording ‘truthfully’ what the world looks like especially across the field of violent acts’ from
the ‘ideological forces simultaneously at work that shape perception of the subject in focus”123.
What both of these positions imply, however timidly, is an admittance that
photography-however precariously124-does contain the ability to make accurate, reproducible,
and recognizable pictures of the world. Yet, Given the long lineage of positivist claims to the
mechanical nature of photography as producing inalienable, ‘un corruptible’, evidence125. It is
necessary to understand that while truthful, the solitary image is insufficient to wholly testify to
what has happened126. The image requires, demands, that words, testimony, and other mediums
make its visual claim legible and legitimate. The reality to which photography testifies is a
promiscuous one, so while the image can attest to a specific moment of reality it is not a fixed
truth of the world, rather, photography produces a nebulous, unmoored, momentary product of
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the photographer's vision which is only legitimized through its interlocking with “another image,
another piece of information, another assertion of description, another grievance or piece of
evidence, another broadcast, another transmitter’... ‘an image is only ever another statement in a
regime of statements’”127. It is against this loose reality of silver halides and pixels, and the
spectators who watch them, that critics of photographs have launched their strongest attacks. It is
telling, then, that few if any of the strongest critics of photography have been able to construct a
case that pictures do not, at least to some extent, show something of the real world. Rather, the
field of their argument rests in the variability of pictorial realities, the nature of their production,
the value of their truth, their power to produce action, and the context in which they are received.

False Histories
Vice Asia published an interview with the Irish artist Matt Loughrey in April of 2021
alongside a series of his re-colored portraits from prisoners of the S21 prisoner death camps in
Cambodia. Re-colorization is the process of taking historical black and white photography, made
before the advent of color film, and digitally ‘matching’ the greys, blacks, and whites with their
corresponding full-spectrum color values. The resulting images give an ‘updated’ ‘modern’ look
to history which is intended to make the distant past seem a little less strange.
In addition to adding color to the black and white portraits, however, he also extensively
altered the faces of the people photographed, including the addition of smiles (Fig 1, and
completely altering people's facial complexions (Fig 2). The original Vice article, which has
since been removed due to public outcry and was replaced with an editorial statement
apologizing “for any pain, this has caused and sincerely apologize to the families of the victims
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and the communities in Cambodia”128, did not include the original black and white images and
presented Loughrey’s ‘colorized’ images as historically accurate. In the original article Loughrey
engages a psycho-analytic framework which he uses to legitimize his added smiles, smirks, and
facial of the prisoners as a reaction to the commands and presence of the guards, while never
admitting to that alteration of the pictures. Later, in an Instagram message, he claimed to have
been working with families who asked him to recolor the images and add smiling faces onto their

loved ones.

Loughrey’s act of forgery is uniquely egregious because the Khmer Rouge images were
often made by the same people who directly carried out the massacre of nearly two million
Cambodians. The photographs that were created in Pol Pot's prisons serve as gruesome evidence
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of their mass slaughter, and transformed the body and personhood of each portrait into an object
by way of the camera, ledger, and filing cabinet; “The central artifact of this system’ then ‘is not
the camera but the filing cabinet”129. There is a fugitivity - in the sense the camera allows for
these prisoners to escape and push beyond the dehumanizing project of the camps - to the
original images that are lost by their manipulation through the hands of colorization. What is lost
amounts to a feeling, a tactile and textual interpretation of the image, which allows for the people
photographed to resist their dehumanization by remaining ‘fugitive’ within the borders of the
photograph.

The haptic here is from Tina M. Campt and her critical reading of prisoner photo albums
at BreakWater prison in British occupied South Africa at the turn of the 20th century. Camp
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defines the haptic: “as multiple forms of touch, which, when understood as constitutive of the
sonic frequencies of these photos, create alternative modalities for understanding the archival
temporalities of images”130. Re-colorizing and upscaling (the process of taking historically
low-quality videos and digitizing them into more high definition 4k and color formats) further
restrict the already limited, but wholly present, fugitive capabilities of those photographs in the
camps.
In so drastically altering the original S21 images it becomes drastically more challenging
to resist the “original intent of the archive: to reduce the individuals to statistics”131. These
images, these faces, we must remember, are the direct product of a physical-chemical reaction,
which is incapable of being translated or scaled into a digital sphere, namely; the reaction of the
light that fell on their faces that day, in that precise moment, and the silver halides which
expanded and contracted, on a thin strip of emulsified photographic film, to produce the image.
The act of removing that physicality, the way the light was captured on that day, with digital
colors and pixels amounts to historical fakery alone, not to mention the facial alterations
Loughrey decided to additionally add. It counteracts and restricts, the lower frequencies of these
images which allowed for their subjects, even in death, to resist the subjectifying forces of
genocide and imprisonment.
The trend towards recolorizing historical evidence, in an attempt to make it more modern,
is part of a troublesome trend in historical photography where the past, as seen through archival
and historical images, becomes a fictional representation of reality because the medium through
which it is remembered does not hold up to the representative mediums of modern technology.
Attesting to the haptic touch of images, and how they are lost in the algorithms that drive
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colorization, makes clear the eerie, perhaps uncanny, images which result from colorizing
historical black and white photos. While it has not been the case for the better part of two
decades it is important to remember that for the majority of its history photography was as much
a tactile interaction with objects as a visual one. It was only in the past two decades, primarily
since the advent of the digital high-megapixel cameras and pocket-sized cell phone cameras, that
images have completely disarticulated from the physical, felt, world.
It is important to note the main argument for digital upscaling of images and videos, from
their original state to digitized recolorizations, is driven by a belief that the past is distant
because of a lack of proper technology to reproduce it, rather than the passing of history.
Re-colonization attempts always produce fiction of history rather than a modernizing vision of
the past. Technically what these images undergo is akin to a form of digital assimilation into
modern visual lexicons by way of highly invasive reconstructive surgery. When artists,
technicians, and historians ‘ recolor’ images what they are doing, on a technical level, is
attempting to ‘match’ the color values of scanned black and white images, which derived from
the physical reaction of silver halides exposed to light, with digital color codes in programs such
as photoshop. The problem with this process, however, is that there is no direct, 1:1, relationship
between silver halides and pixelated color codes. This process is also incapable of reproducing,
accurately, the multitudes of variability which affected these images from the light which fell
when they were produced because black and white film physically reacts to light, thus rendering
any ‘translation’ to digital, or color, impossible. Colors become strangely desaturated, hues are
often misinterpreted, shadows and textures look wrong, while skin tones are often flat and appear
somewhat plasticized. The main loss in upscaling physical film photographs into digital
colorized pictures is the physicality of the original image, which include; the film canisters on
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which rolls of photographs are stored, the process through which they were developed, printer,
and stored, the digital scanning through which the images pass between physical and digital
spaces and the physical reactions between silver halides and light on emulsified film.
This is why, perhaps, watching Denis Shriyave’s AI recolorized videos of New York in
1911 or Wuppertal’s flying train in Germany at the turn of the 20th century, appear more
fictitious than their original black and white counterparts. While some hobbyists, most notably in
online Reddit forums, hand upscale historical pictures and photographs, often at the request of
families, friends, and institutions, most re-colorization is primarily carried out specifically
trained AI networks known as Application Programming Interface’s (API). The goal of these
programs is to teach AI-driven machine learning, or linked groups of AI’s known as Neural Nets,
how to quickly, and more accurately, than the slow and tedious process of hand-selecting and
replacing black and white pixels, known as grayscale values, with their full-color counterparts.
Additionally, colorization APIs often fail to correctly reproduce color accurately
primarily due to historical and cultural conceptions of the past as dull, colorless, and gray in
addition to the limitation of digital technologies. These images are often assumed as being
‘truthful’ reconstructions of the world precisely because they are made by the joining of two
assumed objective bodies; photography and technology. Much like photographs, AI
reconstructed images gain their legitimacy by replacing the untrusting, subjective, hand of the
artist with the objective vision of science and technology. In short, recolorization is a dangerous
myth that propagates functionally false images of historical moments as modern, historically
accurate, full-color images. What results from recolorization is also, frankly, a visually uncanny
image that ends up looking not quite right against the B&W originals and inferior to
contemporary color images.
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However, as author and artist Gwen C. Katz outlined in a Twitter thread after Vice
republished the fake S21 images, these API’s often “strip away the vibrant colors from history
and replace them with a world full of dull tans, muddy browns, and slate grays’...‘[and]
reinforces our impression that the past was the drab and lifeless-in contradiction of reality”132.
Katz, in extremely helpful and clear documentation, took a number of color pictures by Sergey
Prokudin-Gorsky taken between 1909 and 1915 (figure 3), digitally decolorized them in
Photoshop, and then used common, and free, upscaling APIs to produce ‘re-colorizations’ of
those black and white images (figure 4). Side by side these images make exceptionally apparent
the false notion of history, as dull and lacking color, to which digital upscaling and
re-colorization often attest and reproduce.
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The uncanniness of colorization begins to erode the historical assumption of photography
not only looking more like the real world than traditional art but to be able to reproduce it in such
a way that it would become inarguable to debate the events to which it depicted. This is not to
say that cameras may be able to picture the world easily, and with relative accuracy, but rather,
that any similarities of vision between pictures and the real are just that, visions. Much like
Sekula, as outlined by Thomas Keenan, I am not solely interested in outlining the photographic
reality as one which can only be defined as illusory, “that the force of the indexical is not
imminent, that everything is rhetorical or needs to be interpreted”133. Photographs may testify to
a somewhat promiscuous reality but it is challenging, if not impossible, to completely disregard
the vividness with which the visions they produce resemble the world of my eyes. Yet, while
reality may be paramount within the borders of the image, photographs are also discursive
objects which require context and other forms of knowledge for both meaning and accurate
representation. (“The point is not that the camera does not record what it sees, that the camera
lies.”)134 Again, like Sekula, I am interested in “in the ‘conditions’ that make [pictures] work, in
how well it can be made to work, and in the consequences of that “conditional” workaround’”135.
Yet neither form, alone, amount to a photograph;
Neither is correct. Sekula’s argument is more complicated than the mere exposure of the
myth that so often simply inverts an allegiance to the indexical truth into its opposite. He
argues that we need to understand the evidence provided by the photograph not in terms
of its relation to the reality it presents, as if the photograph offered proof that was not
only indexical but decisive or definitive. Rather, photographic evidence must be
considered in terms of the forum or the debate into which its testimony is entered, what
he calls in his Steichen essay its “conditions” and what he calls in “dismantling
modernisms” its presentational circumstances.136
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Recolorization algorithms are clear examples of how photographs are simultaneously
visual objects produced by precise mechanical, technological, and chemical processes as well as
the desires of photographers, institutions, spectators, and the subjects themselves; while
simultaneously not solely the sum of their parts. Furthermore, when we attest to the photograph's
accurate re-producing of a place, person, or ‘time’ is that the form of the image, and the form of
the space, are typically, but not necessarily, in unison. This is why pictures of monuments,
landmarks, and structures, which remain unchanged through time, become such strong objects of
historical representation. Not because the camera reproduced the precise look of the thing, but
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rather, that it can properly attest to the form and the objects placed in a unique space, and be
‘read’(made legible) by a specific mecha-chemical process.

A Folksy Detour.
My argument is rooted, firmly, in agreement with Kampts intense focusing on the haptic
touch of images, in part because for the vast history of photography they have been material, felt
objects as much as they have been visions and pictures. Follow along with me while we
interrogate the legitimacy of the reality of images. Pick up a picture, hold it in your hands, feel in
between your fingers, smell it; perhaps it is framed, just a loose piece of glossy paper, a book of
images, or an entire family album, and will do as long as it is made of physical material, not
digital matter. Now, look at the image, what do you see? Try to distinguish between what you
can see and how the picture makes you feel, what memories it triggers, and what visions it
produces. Not only is the meaning of this picture variable but the world to which it attests is
rarely, actually, how it looked in that moment that time when the photographer clicked a shutter.
Again, to your photo, perhaps it is a family portrait, a headshot from a school yearbook, or
maybe its a more artistic image, regardless, how often can you remember a scene, a moment, or a
lover's face and your memory matches the form of the world of the image? The experience of
gazing into the faces of those who died in S21, surely, must be a different experience for the
families who died. In fact, Lougrhey, without evidence, claimed that he had made the photos
after being asked, or possibly payed his website widely to market the cost of his colorization
work, by the families of those who died. What determines what a photo means, this is to say, is
not held within the content of the image but in the relation spectators have with pictures. If we
seriously consider our images, we will find our memories quite different and that it is the
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presence of the image, the dominance of the form, which has overtaken our senses as primary in
understanding the world. The world in memory is then made in the figure of the camera's vision
rather than the senses.

My picture (fig 5) is of my family, my mother, Michelle, she wears a green-striped shawl,
blue jeans, and dark sunglasses, just behind her left shoulder is me, I am wearing a light grey and
purple tie-dye tee, also with blue jeans, and I am holding a camera (a Nikon FM-3 to be precise),
and lastly, to her right is my father, Steve, he wears a light grey jacket, a white and black baseball
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tee, and blue jeans; in his arms is Buddy, our beloved Weiner dog, he is wearing a red and black
vest and a red leash; we are standing on the beach at Cardiff State Beach in my hometown of
Encinitas, CA. It is New Year's Day.
I have described the image and you have also looked at it, however, you, at least, can not
feel it. While this is a common move in photo theory, it is not so common in discussions of
Human rights and witnessing. Rights have to be made recognizable in vision because they are
not things we can touch and hold. In much the same way you can not touch the frame my
mother placed it in, nor the glass which encases it, none of us can hold ‘the right to a nationality’
but we can hold the paper it was declared and the pictures which defend that right. The camera
also does not tell you how it felt to be there, the sand beneath our feet, the wind in our hair, and
the bonds between us. Nor do you truly know what the picture means, what it meant to be there
and what it means to hold this image. This is the problem with the camera, and its seemingly
endless tenure as properly representational of the world, it can only attest to a single experience
of the senses, that of sight. More than only attest to the way a moment looked, or where objects
and figures were at that time, the long duration of the photograph as being a pure object of vision
has resulted in the dominance of vision over the rest of the senses. The reality, when
photographed, gains a promiscuous relationship to the memories of those who were there, and as
such, the picture's relation to the truth also becomes one defined by promiscuity. That is to say,
photographs can simultaneously resemble the vision of a moment while simultaneously telling
nothing at all about what that place is like. Yes, the picture of my family looks like my family,
but, it also looks like my family in a picture, not as we appear. I want you to try this with the
image in your hands, how often has the person in that picture made that face, not for the Camera?
If they are posed do they ever pose like that in the absence of the camera? If not, if it's one of
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those beloved ‘candid’ images, how many times, in the memories of your eyes, if you are seeing,
has that person, that place, looked like it does in the image? It gets tricky here, looking back-at
least in my visions-reality has become closer in the form to what I see in pictures, it feels, at
times, that reality has become a set stage waiting for the presence of the camera to bring it to the
realm of reality; that the camera has re-written our world so that it constantly appears as though
rather than document the world as it was. At the camera's inception it was bestowed as the pure
eye of god since it spoke in the holy language of the natural universe, mathematics. Now, nearly
two hundred years into photography’s relatively uncriticized ten-year there is “no longer any
solid reality to counter-pose to the reign of appearances, nor any dark reverse side to be opposed
to the triumph of consumer society”; the camera has consumed it.137

Weaponizing Visions
Much like Thomas Keenan I too am interested in “trying to identify and display [in
photography]’…‘a ‘double gesture’: a self-critical hesitation, a turning away and a refocusing, an
investigation of the event of photography itself. It explores the time and space in which reality
anticipates the camera, where the images constitute the event-and it does it with cameras”.138 I
would wager, your picture, as well as mine, doesn’t matter to you or me solely because it is a
visual object. It doesn’t hold meaning solely because people and places are reproduced through
similarities that allow us to recognize the form and the structure of those times and the people we
love. Pictures, especially personal images, have meaning because we were there because we-the
spectators-give them meaning. This is to say, “what is registered by the eye of the camera has no
sense in and of itself-or better, no signification in and of itself-other than those meanings brought
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to bear on it”139, it requires meaning to be welded upon it form the joining of resources, and the
addition of outside contexts; namely “the discourse of written language and the discourse of
photography - are required to produce and ‘fix’ the meaning”140.
Yet, this meaning does not hold, at least not very well. The challenge when speaking of
the political image, the loose field of ‘documentary’ photography, or when images are mobilized
in defense of rights, becomes how to ‘fix’ an intended meaning to a given picture. This challenge
is primarily “the work of a representational practice, which intervenes in the many potential
meanings of an image in an attempt to privilege one”141. What is also made evident in our
needing to explain pictures, as I did above with my family portrait, is that what an image shows,
and how we see that world, is as much a question of the photographs meaning as the discourses
which have attempted to fix a given meaning. This is because not everyone who looks or watches
pictures effectively sees and understands their content, form, and meaning; “seeing requires a
special intention, which is manifested by a certain responsibility on the part of an addressee
toward what is seen”142. Looking, then, becomes a wholly different act than watching or seeing a
photograph. To look at an image is then that most basic of acts, the physical action of
photosensitive rods and corneas processing visual data between the mind, eye, and picture. To
look, rather than watching or seeing images, is a fraught endeavor because it threatens to fix the
image in time and assumes that the object of the camera's vision, people especially, cease to exist
beyond the moment of photography.
The question then must be how do we look at images in such a way which preserves the
real while evading the false photographic vision of the world? Ariella Azoulay outlines one such
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new way of understanding images, namely, through the act of watching pictures them rather than
solely looking;
When the assumption is that not only were the photographed people there, but that, in
addition, they are still present there at the time I’m watching them, my viewing of these
photographs is less susceptible to becoming immoral. Addressing these photographs is a
limited, partial, sometimes imagined attempt to respond to the photographed figure, an
attempt to reconstruct the part it played, which is sometimes difficult to discern at first
glance, and to realize even if fleetingly, a space of political relations between those who
are governed, a space in which the demand not to be ruled in this way becomes the basis
for every civil negotiation.143
To watch images, in Azoulay’s formulation, outlines the act of bearing witness as a discursive
political position and implies a more active and critical read of images than the assumedly more
passive act of only looking at images. The political communities which emerge from such
endeavors are then bound up in a “Civil Contract of Photography [which] seeks to develop a
concept of citizenship through the study of photographic practices and to analyze photography
within the framework of citizenship as a status, an institution, and a set of practices”144. This new
contract reformulates the position of the spectator as a trans-national, non-state-sanctioned,
political body capable of coagulating power amongst itself, solely in the collective position of
the witness, which lies beyond the borders of sovereign territories and the reach of state power. A
long line of critics has conceptualized the distance implied by the camera, between the spectator
and the photographed, as one of inaction, voyeurism, and guilt. This renders all politics which
derive from images useless, this new formulation of watching rather than looking asserts it is
within this distance, one which is made rather dialectical in The Civil Contract of Photography is
precisely where this community finds a political foothold. As Azoulay outlines:
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The relations between the three parties involved in the photographic act - the
photographed person, the photographer, and the spectator - are not mediated through a
sovereign power and are not limited to the bounds of a nation-state or an economic
contract. The users of photography thus re-emerge as people who are not totally
identified with the power that governs them and who have new means to look at and
show its deeds, as well, and eventually to address this power and negotiate it - citizens
and noncitizens alike.145
Functionally, it is another discursive form for attempting to re-order the borders, mechanism, and
politics at play in the image in an attempt to better see what the image shows, which, as I have
outlined already, is, at its core, an attempt to fix the meaning of the image. Unlike past
formulation of such a relationship, where “postmodern theorists- such as Roland Barthes, Jean
Baudrillard, and Susan Sontag - who bore witness to a glut of images were the first fall prey to a
kind of ‘image fatigue’; they simply stopped looking. The world filled up with images of horrors
and they loudly proclaimed that viewers’ eyes had grown unseeing, proceeding to unburden
themselves of the responsibility to hold onto the elementary gesture of looking at what is
presented to one’s gaze [sic]”;146 Azoullay’s formulation is hand-crafted for our modern
democracy of images, where “as long as there are cameras in this world, photographs will
continue to be made simultaneously by different people, and heterogeneous realities will be
presented that will eat away at any supposed monopoly”147. She also accepts that both
photographies capability to build political communities, as well as its ability to legitimize
violence against them, derives from the fact that it “is out there, an object in the world, and
anyone, always (at least in principle), can pull at one of its threads and trace it in such a way as
to reopen the image and renegotiate what it shows, possibly even completely overturning what
was seen in it before”148. In our age of increasing digitization, we must resist the turn to forget
145
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that photography is as much a physical object to touch, cherish, despise, tarnish, create, and
share, as much as it is a digital amalgamation of politics, technology, and pixels on a screen.
Insisting on the physicality of the photograph is an act of resistance against an ever-encroaching
aesthetic politics of isolation and refocusing on a politics of interconnectedness. To do so,
however, “In an age that denies the very existence of society, to insist on the scandal of the
world's increasingly grotesque connectedness in the hidden merciless grinding away beneath the
slick superficial liquidity of markets’... as Sekula outlines ‘is akin to putting oneself in the
position of the ocean swimmer, timing one’s strokes to the swell, turning one's submerged ear
with every breath to the deep rumble of stones rolling on the bottom below. To insist on the
social is simply to practice purposeful immersion.”149
This formulation of the relationship between spectator, photographer, and the
photographed, at first, seems to fall into the common trap, to borrow from Sekula's vivid
language, of attempting to traverse the distance between these three figures through an act of
submersion. Azoulay, rather than resurface on the other side of such a submersion washed clean
of political connotations and civic duty, roots the power of photographs not in the false reality of
the image itself, but in a civic skill which must be learned and engaged by the spectator to and
engage with the subject of the image. What sets Azoulalys prescriptive method of looking at
pictures apart, from the challenging and fraught history of the spectator, lies in active resistance
to a notion of the photographic event as a finality, rather than a beginning. In her conception, the
event of photography should be the begging of a civic and political relationship, rather than the
end of one. This includes replacing the dominant modernist notion of "the command of the single
image, the sacred instant, and the crucial moment”150 with a critical understanding that the
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“solitary image cannot testify to what is revealed through it, but must be attached to another
image, another piece of information, another assertion of description, another grievance or piece
of evidence, another broadcast, another transmitter. An image is only ever another statement in a
regime of statements”151
While the position of the spectator has long been depicted by critics of photography as
one defined by inaction and passivity, Jacques Ranciere reminds us that “Being a spectator is not
some passive condition that we should transform into activity. It is our normal situation’ …
‘Everywhere there are starting points, intersections, and junctions that enable us to learn
something new if we refuse, firstly, radical distance, secondly the distribution of roles, and
thirdly the boundaries between territories’”152. Under the Civil Contract the witness is no longer a
position defined by passivity and inaction, but an engaged and responsible participant in a new
political community. In watching photographs we can engage in a discursive aesthetic encounter
where the people photographed are not conscripted to the finality of the photographic event. To
watch, rather than to look, allows for “a viewing of the photograph that reconstructs the
photographic situation and allows a reading of the injury inflicted on others [to] become a civic
skill, not an exercise in aesthetic appreciation. This skill is activated the moment one grasps that
citizenship is not merely a status, a good, or a piece of private property possessed by the citizen,
but rather a tool of a struggle or an obligation to others to struggle against injuries inflicted on
those others, citizen and non-citizen alike-other who are governed along with the spectator.”153
The historic obligation of the spectator has been assumed to be one of emptiness, the
Civil Contract reminds us that the power to act, to pull a thread of meaning from a photograph, is
always dependent on the actions of the spectator;
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Every photography of others bears the traces of the meeting between the photographed
persons and the photographer, neither of whom can, on their own, determine how this
meeting will be inscribed in the resulting image. The photography excesses any
presumption of ownership or monopoly and any attempt at being exhaustive. Even when
it seems possible to name correctly in the form of a statement what it shows - “This is X”
- it will always turn out that something else can be read in it, some other event can be
reconstructed from it, some other player’s presence can be discerned through it,
constructing the social relations that allowed its production.
It is in the traces of this encounter and the remnants of interaction, where we find evidence of our
interconnectedness, perhaps even shared humanity. Photographs open a shallow cove where
relations between people can unravel relatively free from the breakwaters of state power and
sovereign borders. However, the calm waters of this protected cove are not stagnant, the
incoming tide brings the chilling reminder of deeper waters where “ideological forces [are]
simultaneously at work [to] shape perception of the subject in focus.”154 We must not tread water
here long. While pictures, when engaged with the Civic Contract in mind, can become moments
of respite from state oppression and legitimate spaces of solidarity, they must always be watched
with a critical eye inwards;
“Why are these men, women, children, and families looking at me? Why have they
agreed to be photographed so as to look at me? At whom, precisely, did they seek to look
- was it truly at me? And why? Does their use of photography express a civic skill that
they possess? What am I supposed to do with their look? What is the foundation of the
gaze I might turn back toward them? Is it my gaze alone, or is their demand directed
toward the civil position I occupy? What happens to my citizenship in its encounter with
this look? What happens to it in this encounter with their catastrophe, knowing that they
are more vulnerable than I to catastrophe?155
It is only the act of the self-reflexive turn that allows for the watching of the image to expand
beyond the narrow confines of looking at images. Constant vigilance is required when engaging
the Civic Contract in attempts to dislodge an image from its intended or primary object of vision.
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Not only are forgeries, false histories, and mythic visions rampant in photography, and being
compounded by the increasing expansion of recolorized and AI-created images. Tet as I have
attempted to outline earlier, even the unaltered, ‘natural’ vision of reality must at all times be
treated (at the very least) as a farce, and perhaps also an outright lie. To quote the lucid
aesthetician Jacques Ranciere;
On the one hand, the image said: here is the hidden reality that you do not know how to
see; you must become acquainted with it and act in accordance with that knowledge. But
it is not obviously the case that knowledge of a situation entails a desire to change it. That
is why the image said something else. It said: here is the obvious reality that you do not
want to see, because you know that you are responsible for it. The critical procedure thus
aimed to have a dual effect: an awareness of the hidden reality and a feeling of guilt about
the denied reality.156
Looking at the U.S. occupation and war in Afghanistan provides a clear example of why images
must always be regarded with a certain wariness. Muheb Estmat’s recent thesis exhibit, No End
in Sight, at the Center for Curatorial Studies at Bard College was the first American showing of
three works by the Afghani artist Aziz Hazara. It included a series of images taken through night
vision goggles, Camouflage (2016); a video installation made up of found footage of various
archives and broadcasts beginning with the Russian invasion in 1979, Dialectics (2016); and a
photographic investigation of the large white surveillance dirigibles which eerily hover Kabul,
Kite Balloon (2018)157. All three works, as Harar said in an online interview, “are connected in
the sense that they look at the invisible side of the war. The invisible, or less visible, aspects of
the war”, and the optical devices, tools, and infrastructures through which the war is continued.
The Gulf War may well have signified a major turning point in the relationship between
photographers and war, introducing both the combat shooter armed with a Nikon d5 as well as an
ar-15 and the embedded photojournalist. The larger development, however. was the “signaling
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[of] a new stage in the government’s efforts to monopolize control over the visual image and to
impose itself-produced images on the media”158. Hazara’s work, specifically the Camouflage
images, is quite literally a critical inversion of the vision of the war through the lens of the
cameras which support it.
Using military-grade
night-vision goggles which
made night raids such a
common and viable part of
the war, “the Camouflage
photographs are cast in a
green hue that produces a
dystopian frame for a
landscape occupied with
disconsolate bodies traumatized by night raids—people whose stories and experiences have been
structurally denied the voice and justice they deserve''159. Yet, it was through this alternative,
uncanny, vision that the war was carried out.
Much like the re-colorized S21 pictures, the Camouflage images (fig 6 &7) recreate the
landscape of Afghanistan in an uncanny, unreal, vision. The S21 images have a ‘reality,’ the
original B&W mugshots, against which the upscaled images can be contrasted. In Camouflage,
however, no such relative reality exists, instead, we are left to gaze at Afghanistan through the
very visions of how the war was carried out. These pictures also serve as reminders that
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“Conflict doesn’t happen with guns alone. Education, visual media, language and slang itself is
all becoming increasingly militaristic.”160

War has increasingly become a photographic endeavor, “in the past decade, new
means-not necessarily immediately identifiable as means of execution per se-have been
implemented that should be added to this list: unmanned Aerial Vehicles equipped with cameras,
expulsion and closed fortress border systems, Sentry Tech Systems (call in Israel, where it was
invented, ‘Spot and Strike’), and flood-flow management”161; in addition to unmanned drone
warfare, satellite surveillance, and the tethered surveillance dirigible which haunts the skies of
160
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Kabul daily. As states and armies have moved towards both weaponizing photography and
making weapons photographic it has become increasingly difficult to rest alternative meanings
and realities away from the rule of the militaries approved ‘photojournalism’.

In Kite Balloon, from the exhibition website, “the artist turns his attention to the latest
incarnation of the visualization technologies deployed in the war, represented by all-seeing
blimps hovering over Kabul. As they keep watch over the population, their extensive capabilities
are largely unknown and highly classified”162. The airship sits alone above the city of Kabul, it
could be mistaken for a cloud. The city sprawls away from the camera, the zeppelin holding dead
center. We get a sense of scale and a slim slice of the perspective awarded whatever cameras and
instruments are looking down from the belly of the ship. The balloon is relatively unknown, its
162
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function, capabilities, and reasoning are all being undisclosed by the American military, but,
local rumors circulate that it can “zoom in to the point that they could read the writing of
someone’s newspaper”163. Yet, unlike Camouflage, we do not see the eerie view from the ship.
That view remains locked and for now, unknowable. What Kite Balloon does outline is how
technologies of vision, mainly photography “not only allow for the continuation but also the
expansion of the Afghan war beyond what we normally perceive as a battlefield”164. The
presence of the camera here, like surveillance, creates a self-legitimizing paradox whereby the
very act of its presence becomes legitimization for more violence, for extending the war, which,
in turn, leads to more upheaval and the cycle begins anew.
Both Kite Balloon and Camouflage serve reminders that the role of spectator, no matter
how she engages the image, be it watching, looking, touching, listening, or seeing, is constrained
ultimately by the aesthetic limits of the photographic itself. As Esmat said himself; “Histories are
hazy, so for any visual representations, the politics behind them need to be considered. If we take
them as truths, then we’ve already begun to take sides, and we’re giving those people the tools to
fight their fight. In essence - we all have a responsibility in stopping this war’”165. There may be
images where different meanings and realities can be snatched away from dominant power
structures. Hazara’s images remind us that as militaries and states move to self-produce their
images, and further construct the allowed narratives of war, extracting resistant narratives and
meanings is becoming an increasingly more challenging endeavor.
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We live in capitalism. Its power seems inescapable. So did the divine right of kings. Any
human power can be resisted and changed by human beings. Resistance and change often
begin in art, and very often in our art, the art of words.
~ Ursula K. Le Guin

Coda
In the final pages of Human Rights in Camera Sliwinski writes, “Humanity is not simply given
rather exists only as a precarious, virtual community brought into being, in part, through our
grappling with world events at a distance - in camera”. Nevertheless, since the advent of rights
which could exist in camera and in the short history of the witnesses who gaze at them, the
greatest disappointment of the camera is that there has been “no end to international and civil
wars of genocidal violence.” Far from preventing violence the Camera has increasingly been
constructed as the site and justification for vicious attacks on human rights. The pictorial trail
“plainly shows, spectators’ capacity to witness such events from a distance has had little effect
on the frequency of savageness of these atrocities.” This is the central frustration of the Human
Rights project; bearing witness to violence, war, and genocide has never proven enough to stop
it, only make it visible for those who where not there. To ever expect pictures could be the silver
bullet which unravels the worst violence of the Human condition was, perhaps, a lofty
expectation. Nonetheless, is this not the grand promise of Human Rights? As Sliwinski writes;
“Current human rights discourse presents a familiar dream of liberation and redemption from the
violence and aggression that has ruined the world. As in all dreams, a potent wish drives this
discursive formulaton: the wish to put an end to the suffering witnessed through the camera’s
lens. As laudable a dream as it may be, without historical insight, without the recognition of this
dream as a dream, human rights discourse, Walter Benjamin mightsay, forgets its own history
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and sinks into an even deeper sleep.”166 Implicit in declaring every person ‘inalienable in rights
and dignity’ as the Universal declaration states, is an expectation that rights must also be
universally recognized and“that when the world spectator encount[ers] something that [throws]
her imagination into conflict with her reason” she would rush to the defence of rights.167 Yet,
“History has taught us the tragedy of this faith.”168 Contemporary witnesses also remind us,
however, that pictures are not always a dead end for ensuring rights. Rather it would seem,
pictures are not where rights are defended, only where they were-and are-first imagined; a
distinction which should not be overlooked. The defence of rights is always, for better or worse,
made in the judgment of spectors who, having witnessed in camera, choose to muster a defence
of these rights.
The end of the 20th brought many such moments for judgement to be exercised, and yet,
even in the excess of the images that prospered throughout the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia,
as well as the gulf wars Human Rights could not be mustered to bring about a serious cessation
of violence. This is not to say spectators did not know, looked away, or had become accustomed
to such images of violence. Across the world spectators resisted and campaiged to bring about
the end of these wars and genocide, but it was not enough. At this moment, at least, the power of
spectators could not move the world. The Failure of Human Rights to live up to its most basic
promise led to, at the turn of the century, for the experience of the world’s spectators to be
something close to angst “that is, a respect for the idea of humanity without the dignified,
exultant confidence in universal reason.”169 As the pictorial trail reminds us, we have yet to live
through a moment when rights have been totally universal or completely inalienable. But the
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failure of rights in one moment should not be taken as an indictment of rights in general, and,
“even angst demands to be communicated, indeed, perhaps especially this feeling, this brush up
against the incommensurable, this aesthetic meeting with injustice that drives the world spectator
to stretch her judgement and to share her evaluation with others. Perhaps this is what the sensus
communis presupposes and finally promises: the idea of a world that is shared by all, an
expansive fabric of human judgment from which to weave a home fit to live in.”170 The path to
making rights universally assured and never violated, is as of yet, unmarked. In their current
construction the ultimate of universal rights, the only place they have been asserted in full
without the messy contradictions of their political affirmations, is within the borders of the
photograph. This is what it means for Human Rights to be photographic, ultimately, that rights
find their strongest shelter, and greatest defence, in the fragile light of the camera's prism.
Indeed, “these fragile concepts - humanity, human rights - are ultimately conjured’ only amidst
the judgment of a spectator in the order of the world in silver-halides and pixels; ‘and as such,
they are concepts and realities that are always, in some sense, to come;”171. As shaky as this
foundation might appear, these seemingly simple acts of witnessing and judgment, are the
“means by which humanity perpetually seeks - and perhaps may someday find - its home in the
world.”172 Pictures so often feel vastly insignificant in a world so rife with violence, this much is
known, what is not known is how much longer such a world order will be allowed to prosper. To
bear witness to the violence of this world in pictures allow for brief moments of solidarity and
open a space where spectators might begin to see the world, not as it is, but as it could be. The
future is undecided, perhaps it will be written in the silver light of the camera and brought into
existence by the judgement of spectators. Human Rights were first imagined in the order of the
170
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world as seen in pictures, in their moment this was an immensely radical act of dedication and
assurance to the existence and defence of Humanity. Perhaps a new world, a more just one, is
also hidden amongst this scattering of light. Pictures simply provide the space for such an
imagination to begin, it is the role of the spectator to seek out and bear witness to all such hidden
possibilities.
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